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INTRODUCTION (1)
Fiscal policy, in both its macroeconomic and microeconomic strands
(the former concerning the control of the level and composition of de-
mand, the latter the impact of the tax system, of the level and structure of
government consumption, and of infrastructure, etc. on economic agents’
consumption and investment decisions), is destined to have an increas-
ingly greater influence over economic activity. Several factors explain this
relevance of fiscal policy. On one hand, the policies regulating private
agents’ economic activity are structural and, therefore, discontinuous. As
the structural reforms to liberalise markets (including most notably the
labour market) and standardise regulations in the EU economic space
are progressively completed, national authorities will, in a fully liberalised
setting, see their scope increasingly curtailed, and the use of such poli-
cies by national authorities in their economies as discretionary interven-
tion instruments will be increasingly less possible. As to incomes policies,
these lack the versatility and flexibility necessary for use in the very short
term, not to mention the major difficulties that reaching agreements in an
increasingly diversified and flexible economy entails. Such an incomes
policy is seen as an exceptional instrument lacking the sufficient flexibility
to enable its continued use in the short term.Against this background, fis-
cal policy, along with monetary policy, assumes a leading role as a
macroeconomic policy instrument for the coming years. However, two
factors also curtail the margin for manoeuvre of fiscal policy. First, the ex-
pansionary and pro-cyclical nature of fiscal policy in the previous boom
ensued in a considerable increase in the structural general government
budget deficit, leading subsequently in the latest recession to high bud-
get-deficit and outstanding-public-debt levels. Given the deterioration
there has been, the short-term fiscal policy priority can be no other than
budgetary consolidation and the stabilisation of the public debt/GDP ratio.
Second, the transition to Monetary Union – the conditioning factors of
7
( 1 ) We gratefully acknowledge the suggestions and comments by Isabel Argimón,
José María Bonilla, José Manuel González-Páramo, José Marín and Francisco Martí on
preliminary versions of this work.
which are detailed in the Maastricht Treaty – makes the need for fiscal
consolidation even more pressing, so that one of the criteria governing
entry into the Union may be met. This is the excessive fiscal deficit criteri-
on whereunder, broadly speaking, public debt and the general govern-
ment budget deficit may not exceed 60 % and 3 % of GDP, respective-
ly(2).
These conditioning factors are placed in sharper relief if regard is had
to the fact that the budgetary imbalance in 1994 was moderate, in view of
the heavy deterioration in public finances in 1993 and considering that
the pick-up in economic activity was greater than expected. The design of
fiscal policy according to the 1995 Budget and the initial budget outturn
data for the year also point to a limited reduction in the deficit. All these
factors accentuate the need to accelerate the fiscal consolidation process
embarked upon in 1994.
This work makes a detailed analysis of the fiscal policy pursued from
1988 to 1994 and its possible contribution to the process of convergence
towards Monetary Union. Chapter I outlines fiscal policy from a macroe-
conomic perspective, focusing on developments in the various revenue
and expenditure captions. By means of the use of discretionary action in-
dicators, the fiscal policy stance in the period spanning 1988 to 1994 is
then characterised in Chapter II. Chapter III examines the macroeconom-
ic impact of fiscal policy, specifically on inflation, the external deficit and
economic agents’ uncertainty. In Chapter IV a study is made of the fiscal
policy perspective with a view to Monetary Union. Lastly, in Chapter V,
the main conclusions are drawn. Two appendices complete the work, the
first detailing the budgetary policy measures adopted in the period 1988-
1995, and the second describing the methods of computing the discre-
tionary action of fiscal policy.
8
(2) Several factors need to be taken into account to judge the fiscal deficit as “exces-
sive”. These include the economy’s cyclical position, the exceptional nature of the deviation,
the fall in the debt ratio at a continuous and sufficient rate, the fact that public investment
should be greater than the deficit, etc. In any event, these complementary factors are de-
fined with a considerable degree of ambiguity.
IBASIC FEATURES OF FISCAL POLICY
IN THE PERIOD 1988-1994
Fiscal policy affects all areas of activity engaged in by economic
agents, whether these are consumers, employees or employers. Incen-
tives and potential distortions wielding a powerful influence on the level of
economic activity, the sectoral productive structure, and the growth and
composition of aggregate demand are generated by a series of factors.
These include most notably the design of the tax system (both overall
and in terms of each particular tax); the composition of government con-
sumption (its degree of substitutability or complementarity in relation to
private consumption); the degree of income redistribution introduced by
government action; the implementation of regulations governing social
and economic activity; and the degree of effective protection vis-à-vis the
external sector (via tariffs, import quotas or specific regulations, etc.). A
detailed analysis of the effects of fiscal policy is thus a task beyond the
scope of this work.
The present chapter solely analyses fiscal policy in its macroeconom-
ic policy facet. It studies the major public revenue and spending aggre-
gates, and the potential impact that the level and composition of such ag-
gregates, coupled with the resulting general government budget deficit,
have had on the business cycle. In particular, it focuses on the effects of
fiscal policy design on the economic policy mix.
I.1. Fiscal policy before 1988
Historically, State intervention in economic activity was based on reg-
ulatory norms rather than on budgetary measures. It was only after the
mid-seventies that general government spending grew; indeed, its weight
in terms of GDP doubled in the period from 1975 to 1985. This was the
9
result of an approximation to European standards of social welfare that
commenced with the restoration of democracy. This long-term tendency
was reinforced by the economic crisis in the second half of the seventies,
which led to an increase in transfer payments to households and firms so
as to alleviate the impact of the crisis. The twin pressures on public
spending – one structural the other cyclical – were not sufficiently offset
by the increase in public revenue, despite the favourable tax-raising re-
sults stemming from the 1977-78 fiscal reform. These changes in the fis-
cal policy environment entailed a strong increase in the general govern-
ment budget deficit, which rose to 6.9 % of GDP in 1985.
In parallel to this widening of the budget shortfall, partial progress was
recorded in the management of public finances. In particular, as from
1982, the monetisation of the budget deficit was progressively reduced
and a more orthodox means of funding was adopted. That provided for
an increase in the degree of autonomy – and efficiency – of monetary
policy, although other financial distortions arising from the introduction of
compulsory ratios for credit institutions were caused. Nonetheless, this
more orthodox financing of the deficit had an adverse impact in the short
term, since the increase in the interest burden more than countered the
efforts to contain public spending and the increase in tax revenue.
A considerable fiscal consolidation drive was undertaken in 1986 and
1987. As a result, the overall general government budget deficit in 1987
stood at 3.1 % of GDP, i.e. 3.8 percentage points down on two years pre-
viously. Although such progress was notable, it came about mainly due to
increases in revenue (2.1 percentage points of GDP between 1985 and
1987) rather than to the containment of expenditure (which declined even
so by 1.7 percentage points of GDP between 1985 and 1987). The nature
of these budgetary dynamics, the difficulty in containing the growth of
spending and the dependence on the strength of revenue to correct the
budget imbalance were at the root of the difficulties that would arise in the
following phase of economic slowdown.
Despite the advances made, the substantive problems behind the in-
crease in the budget imbalance persisted. There was continuing pressure
on spending resulting from the setting in place of an increasingly broader
welfare state, along the lines of the wealthiest European countries. At the
same time, the pursuance of administrative decentralisation, associated
with the consolidation of the “State of Autonomies” (the devolution of
powers to regional governments), entailed a sustained increase in gov-
ernment consumption. Adding to this was an ambitious public investment
programme, which sought to remedy in a very short time the deficiencies
built up in past decades. On the revenue side, the strong increases in tax
takings further to the 1977-78 fiscal reform (which set a modern direct
taxation system in place) and the introduction of VAT in 1986 provided for
10
intense and rapid growth in the tax burden. This could not continue in the
future, inasmuch as the Spanish tax system was now fully in line with the
European norm. Only the improvements in tax administration and in com-
bating fraud, the process of EU harmonisation and of indirect taxation lev-
els and the positive impact of the cycle on tax revenue would offer any
margin for increasing the tax burden. And then such an increase could
not be equated to the structural leap forward attained with the establish-
ment in Spain of a modern tax system.
The firmly embedded upward trend of spending as a percentage of
GDP and the gradual tapering off of the margin for manoeuvre available
on the revenue side shaped a complex situation which, nonetheless, ap-
peared to be circumvented by the rapid growth experienced by the Span-
ish economy. In the following years, and as the favourable contribution of
the cycle progressively dwindled, the substantive problems at the root of
the budgetary imbalance in the first half of the eighties resurfaced.
Adding to this, lastly, was a process of expenditure decentralisation, pur-
suant to the implementation of the so-called State of Autonomies. This
implementation would give rise to fresh pressures on the deficit – namely,
the great weight of State transfers and the lack of “fiscal co-responsibility”
introduced thereby – due both to the tendency towards expenditure dupli-
cation this generated and to the distortions arising from the financing
structure for these new territorial entities.
I.2. The period 1988-1994
1988 marked a turning point in the public finances imbalance. Firstly,
the business cycle showed the first signs of petering out; although the
year was still one of forceful expansion (GDP grew by 5.2 % in real
terms), the first symptoms of a slowdown in economic activity became
perceptible. Further, the fiscal containment drive embarked upon in 1985
finalised that year, which was partly concealed by the contribution of the
cyclical upturn to the moderation of public spending and to tax revenue
persistence. Lastly, the economic boom and the success in checking the
budget deficit in 1986 and 1987 intensified the pressures on public
spending, specifically on that aimed at extending welfare coverage. The
culminating point of such pressures was the December 1988 general
strike. This unequivocally governed fiscal policy in subsequent years, and
is one of the factors that explains the grind to a halt (and later backtrack-
ing) in the fiscal consolidation attained in the previous period.
As Table I.1 and Chart I.1 reveal, the reduction of the budget deficit
tailed off after 1988, stabilising at somewhat over 3 % of GDP between
1987 and 1990. In effect, the apparent decline in 1989 was the conse-
11
quence of transferring to 1990 the refunds relating to excess personal in-
come tax paid in 1988, for an estimated volume of PTA 323 billion (equiv-
alent to about 0.7 percentage points of GDP). After 1990, the budget
deficit began to widen, moving from 4.1 % in 1990 to 4.9 % in 1991, 4.2
% in 1992 (the result in part of a new transfer of personal income tax re-
funds from 1992 to 1993 for a net volume of PTA 195 billion, 0.3 percent-
age points of GDP) and 7.5 % in 1993. A moderate reduction in the deficit
began in 1994, placing it at 6.7 % of GDP. Examination of the primary
deficit – i.e. the budget deficit less interest actually paid – reveals a simi-
lar pattern to the total budget deficit (Chart I.2): the primary deficit, after
holding stable at marginally negative values, began to widen as from
1990, a process only interrupted in 1992, rising after a sharp leap to 2.2
% of GDP in 1993, and dipping to 1.4 % in 1994.
Regarding public debt (Chart I.3) it should be noted that, despite (i)
the stabilising of the deficit in terms of GDP at the end of the eighties; (ii)
the relative increase in the financial cost of debt (due to a more orthodox
financing of the deficit); and (iii) the taking over of liabilities from public-
sector enterprises, the ratio of public debt to GDP not only did not in-
crease in the initial years but even fell from 45.5 % in 1987 to 41.7 % in
1988, rising to 45.8 % in 1991. The relative moderation of the public
debt/GDP ratio, the result of the strength of GDP growth (which grew on
average in nominal terms by 11 % between 1988 and 1991)( ), came to
an end in 1992. That year, the recession manifested itself with greater in-
tensity (real GDP growth was only 0.7 %, 7.5 % in nominal terms), and
the debt/GDP ratio increased by almost three percentage points to 48.4
%. In 1993 the debt/GDP ratio climbed 12 points, due both to the widen-
ing of the budget deficit and to the decline in GDP growth (Chart I.4). The
ceiling of 60 % of GDP, agreed under the Maastricht Treaty as one of the
convergence conditions for entry into the last stage of European Mone-
tary Union, was thus overstepped. Despite the pick-up in the rate of eco-
nomic growth and the slight reduction in the primary deficit in 1994, the
debt/GDP ratio still increased by 2.6 percentage points that year. That ev-
idences the difficulty of stabilising this ratio at times, such as the present,
when public finances are heavily in disequilibrium.
On analysing the breakdown of the budget deficit into revenue and
expenditure, the key feature that emerges is the simultaneous increase in
the weight of both in relation to GDP. Expenditure increased from 41.1 %
in 1988 to 48.2 % in 1994. This surge may be attributable, but only in
part, to the effect of the recession: between 1988 and 1991, the jump to-
talled 4.2 points of GDP, despite the economic expansion in those years
(real growth of 5.2 % in 1988, falling to 2.2 % in 1991). Revenue in-
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(1) The heavy fall in 1988 is attributable, however, to a change in the accounting for
relations between the ICO (Official Credit Institute) and the State.
creased by 3.8 percentage points of GDP between 1988 and 1994 as a
result of the advance of tax revenue, which rose by 2.7 points of GDP,
and of transfers and other revenue, which climbed by 1.1 points of GDP.
Of particular note was the slide in tax revenue in 1993, due to the effect
of the recession and to the changes in tax management. Though partly
offset in 1994, this placed the share of revenue in GDP in 1994 at 0.6
points below that of 1992.
This distinctive feature of Spanish public finances (the widening of the
budget deficit as a result of growth in expenditure that cannot be offset by
the simultaneous expansion of public revenue) runs counter to the experi-
ence of the main EU countries. In the latter, the rise in the budget deficit
originates in tax reforms entailing a reduction in the tax burden. In Spain,
although certain tax measures entailing forgone revenue came about
(such as the new personal income tax arrangements that came into force
in 1992), these were more than offset with other measures increasing
taxes. In short, it is the upward-trending dynamics of public spending, as-
sociated only in part with the impact of the economic crisis, that underlies
the widening of the budget deficit between 1988 and 1994: whereas the
average nominal growth of GDP was 8.7 % during these years, that of
public spending was 11.3 %.
13
CHART I.1
PUBLIC REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE
see chart I.1
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
1
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Of the main determinants of the growth of aggregate public spending,
welfare benefits exhibit the biggest rate of increase. This is especially so
from 1990 to 1993, when their nominal growth was, on average, almost
six percentage points higher than that of GDP at current prices. The dras-
tic slowdown witnessed over the past two years, when their nominal
growth plunged from almost 14 % to 4.3 %, did not prevent the growth of
their weight in relation to GDP (by 0.6 points, up to 16.7 %, 2.9 percent-
age points more than in 1987). This was as a result of the slackness of
economic activity in 1993 (nominal GDP grew by only 3.2 %) and despite
the cut of three-tenths of a point of GDP made in 1994. Table I.3 offers a
classification of welfare benefits under various headings. As can be seen,
it is economic benefits (as opposed to health-care or in-kind benefits) that
are most preponderant. Within these economic benefits, contributory pen-
sions account for almost 53 % of total benefits, while unemployment ben-
efits represent 18.7 % of the aggregate (1.1 percentage points more than
in 1988, as a result of the economic recession and of the increase in the
eligibility rate, which was partly corrected in 1994). Though of secondary
significance, the relative weight of benefits for provisional invalidity (1 %)
and non-contributory pensions (1.3 %) is increasing, while benefits for
temporary labour disability inverted this trend as a result of the changes
16
CHART I.2
DEFICIT AND PRIMARY DEFICIT
see chart I.2
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
in the regulations governing them in 1992 to curb the budgetary overrun
recorded in prior years (caused by the fraudulent use of these benefits).
The trend growth of benefits raises doubts about their future financ-
ing. In years of low growth, the weight of these benefits in relation to GDP
may reasonably be expected to increase due either to the impact of the
cycle (on unemployment and other benefits, via an increase in fraud or in
early retirements), or to the unresponsiveness to the cycle of many bene-
fits (which depend on structural factors, such as the aging of the popula-
tion). To illustrate the problems of the future sustainability of benefits,
table I.4 details their excess nominal growth in terms of GDP. Every year,
except 1994, the increase in benefits is greater than that in GDP at cur-
rent prices. The systematic upward bias is more evident in the case of
contributory pensions and health-care benefits. And adding to these have
been non-contributory benefits and those for temporary labour disability
and provisional invalidity (although they are of quantitatively lesser signifi-
cance). That said, the accelerated increase in non-contributory benefits is
attributable to their recent introduction (in place, moreover, of other bene-
fits, such as those assigned to the social integration of the disabled).
Noteworthy in 1994, in addition to the aforementioned effect on tempo-
17
CHART I.3
PUBLIC DEBT
GENERAL GOVERNMENT LEVELS
see chart I.3
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
rary labour disability, is the fact that the measures adopted in 1992 and
1993 to contain spending on unemployment benefits provided for a re-
duction in this item. In short, it may be deduced from Table I.4 that the
trend growth of benefits is far higher than that of GDP. Indeed, even a
rapid recovery in economic activity to growth rates close to potential
would not guarantee a check on the progressive rise in the weight of
welfare benefits as a proportion of GDP. That raises doubts about the fu-
ture sustainability of such benefits and about the current financing ar-
rangements for them.
After benefits, government consumption is the component that has
most contributed to increasing the weight of public spending in terms of
GDP. Between 1987 and 1994 its share in GDP climbed by 1.9 percent-
age points. This was the result of strong growth in nominal terms be-
tween 1989 and 1992, in turn the outcome of the growth in compensation
per employee, owing both to the expansion of employment in the public
sector (which increased by an annual average of 4.6 % between 1989
and 1992) and to wage rises (in annual average terms compensation per
employee grew by 9.4 % over this period). This growth sharply declined
in 1993 and 1994 further to the wage-restraint and staffing-freeze mea-
sures adopted under the respective Budgets for these two years (com-
18
CHART I.4
BUDGET DEFICIT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
see chart I.4
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
pensation per employee is estimated to have grown by 3.3 % in annual
average terms, and employment by 0.1 %).
Turning to public investment, its weight as a proportion of GDP
climbed 0.5 percentage points between 1987 and 1994, from 3.4 % to 3.9
% of GDP, peaking at 5 % in 1990. This notable increase in public invest-
ment meant that, in 1989, the so-called “golden rule” of public finance in
its strictest version could once again be met; namely, that the budget
deficit did not exceed net general government investment. However, the
fact that this rule should once again have been met (after ten years of ex-
cessive deficits) as a result of the increase in investment above what
would be sustainable in the medium term (rather than as a result of the
deficit diminishing), and against the background of a rapid expansion in
aggregate demand, had a substantial destabilising effect: it exacerbated
the disequilibria that had built up in the Spanish economy and thus con-
tributed to check the pace of economic growth.
In the period 1988-1994, the interest burden/GDP ratio increased by
1.9 percentage points to 5.3 % of GDP in 1994. Behind this development
were the effects of (i) the growing stock of outstanding government debt;
(ii) the increase in the portion of this stock financed at market prices; and
(iii) the uptrend of the primary deficit, especially as from 1990. The ex-
pansion of this public spending caption clearly illustrates the deficit feed-
back effects caused by its increase in recent years, as well as the re-
duction of fiscal policy leeway that this increase in the debt burden
entails. For this expenditure component to moderate, the primary deficit
19
TABLE I.2
GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEFICIT AND DEBT
% of GDP
General government
deficit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 3.3 2.8 4.1 4.9 4.2 7.5 6.7
State + Central
Government
Administrative 
Agencies. . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 2.9 2.2 2.9 2.5 2.3 6.0 5.1
Social Security. . . . . . . . –0.3 0.0 –0.2 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.5
Autonomous
Communities. . . . . . . . –0.1 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.4 1.0 1.1 1.0
Local Governments. . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Primary deficit. . . . . . . . . –0.3 –0.1 –0.7 0.4 1.0 –0.0 2.2 1.4
Gross public debt. . . . . . 45.5 41.7 43.2 45.1 45.8 48.4 60.4 63.0
Of the State. . . . . . . . . . .41.5 37.4 36.8 38.7 38.4 40.3 51.1 52.8
19941993199219911990198919881987
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
– i.e. the rest of the public-finance components – must evidently be con-
t r o l l e d .
The detailed examination of revenue reveals that in the period 1988-
1994 it has risen as a proportion of GDP by 3.8 percentage points, 2.7
points of which relate to the increase in tax revenue, and the remainder to
foreign transfers (from the EU) and to atypical revenue (such as those
arising from the extraordinary profits of the Banco de España in 1992 and
1993, or from privatisation proceeds). Significantly, there was a slight
downtrend in taxes linked to production and imports, the ratio of which to
GDP slipped by 0.2 percentage points between 1987 and 1994. Although
this is due to the progressive lowering of tariff barriers (which started with
20
TABLE I.3
COMPOSITION OF WELFARE BENEFITS
Percentages
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Economic benefits. . . . . . . . . . . .91.7 91.0 90.7 90.5 90.4 91.0 90.9
General government,
excluding Social Security. . . . 10.4 10.3 10.1 10.1 10.5 9.6 9.4
Social Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81.4 80.8 80.6 80.4 79.9 81.4 81.4
System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59.3 59.2 58.8 57.3 57.4 58.2 60.5
Contributory pensions . . . . . . 53.1 53.0 52.4 50.6 49.5 50.6 52.9
Temporary labour disability . 4.7 5.0 5.3 5.5 5.3 4.6 4.3
Provisional invalidity . . . . . . . 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0
Non-contributory pensions. . . — — — 0.1 0.6 1.0 1.3
Non-contributory family
allowances . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — — 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4
Contributory family
allowances . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.5
INEM (National Employment
Office). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19.5 19.4 19.7 21.0 20.9 22.0 19.8
Unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . .17.6 17.5 17.9 19.3 19.8 20.5 18.7
Other Social Security. . . . . . . . 2.5 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.5 1.0 1.0
Benefits transferred to
Autonomous Communities. . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Benefits in kind. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.8
Health-care benefits. . . . . . . . . . . 7.6 7.9 8.0 8.1 8.4 8.1 8.3
System (a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.7 3.0 2.9 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3
Other Social Security. . . . . . . . 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.4
Benefits transferred to
Autonomous Communities. 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.9 4.2 4.1 4.6
1994199319921991199019891988
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
(a) Mainly medication.
Spanish accession to the EU in 1986) and to the growing share of the EU
in the revenue raised on these taxes in Spain, the decline is admittedly
striking; all the more so if the tax increases of recent years in VAT and in
excise duties are taken into account. Likewise, consideration should be
given to the management shortcomings and fraud affecting these taxes
when explaining the decline.
Taxes on income and wealth ran in an opposite direction, with their
share in GDP increasing by 1.1 points between 1987 and 1994 (2.1
points to 1992). Chiefly, this was the result of developments in personal
income tax, the related revenue for which has not been very affected by
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TABLE I.4
BENEFITS: DIFFERENCE IN RELATED RATES OF CHANGE COMPARED
WITH THAT OF GDP
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.3 0.8 3.5 6.3 6.6 5.6 –2.3
Economic benefits. . . . . . . . . . . .–1.1 –0.1 3.1 5.9 6.6 6.4 –2.4
General government,
excluding Social Security. . . . –5.0 –0.5 1.7 6.3 11.4 –3.8 –4.4
Social Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.6 0.0 3.3 5.9 6.0 7.7 –2.2
System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.1 0.7 2.7 3.3 6.7 7.1 1.9
Contributory pensions . . . . . . 0.3 0.6 2.2 2.2 4.3 7.9 2.4
Temporary labour disability . . . 3.4 8.7 9.4 11.0 3.3 –8.7 –10.9
Provisional invalidity . . . . . . .–13.3 –8.1 4.1 22.0 22.5 28.2 15.7
Non-contributory pensions . . — — — — 804.9 71.8 33.3
Non-contributory family
allowances . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — — — 589.4 21.2 295.2
Contributory family
allowances . . . . . . . . . . . . .–14.4 –13.6 –14.6 –8.3 148.0 –0.8 –44.0
INEM (National Employment
Office). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.5 0.2 5.0 14.1 6.0 11.7 –12.6
Unemployment . . . . . . . . . . . .–3.0 0.5 5.9 15.4 9.5 9.3 –11.1
Other Social Security. . . . . . . .–19.0 –17.5 1.5 0.6 –18.3 –27.7 –11.9
Benefits transferred to
Autonomous Communities. — 7.8 20.6 13.7 13.9 18.6 –3.9
Benefits in kind. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43.5 54.1 34.5 23.1 –19.3 –19.3 –10.5
Health-care benefits. . . . . . . . . . . 16.9 6.5 4.2 7.2 11.9 1.5 0.4
System(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–51.5 13.6 –0.1 –9.8 3.6 7.5 –7.5
Other Social Security. . . . . . . . 11.1 –9.1 6.5 5.8 20.1 –8.8 –12.3
Benefits transferred to
Autonomous Communities. 9.2 6.9 22.1 13.7 2.5 10.1
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Nominal GDP growth. . . . . . . . . 11.2 12.2 11.3 9.5 7.5 3.2 6.2
1994199319921991199019891988
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
(a) Mainly medication.
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the reform that came into force in 1992. Regarding corporate income tax,
after the related revenue peaked at 3.2 % of GDP in 1990 (a result stem-
ming from the corporate profits of the previous years), it slid to 1.9 % in
1994, due mainly to the impact of the recession on the tax base. It should
be clarified that the strong rise in 1989 (29.4 %) in these taxes is at-
tributable to discretionary measures, such as the transfer of personal in-
come tax refunds (totalling PTA 323 billion) to 1990, the increase in the
proportion of corporate income tax prepayments or the rise in withhold-
ings on capital income (from 20 % to 25 %).
Social security contributions, for their part, have increased as a pro-
portion of GDP, rising by 1.6 percentage points to 14.4 % of GDP in
1994. The strength of revenue relating to this item (their average nominal
growth between 1988 and 1994 was 10.6 %, compared with average
growth of nominal GDP of 8.7 %) is due, in part, to the measures adopted
in the past three years to raise rates and widen bases (between 1992 and
1994, the average growth of contributions was 8.7 %, against average
growth of GDP of 5.6 %). However, the adverse impact on employment
that would ultimately result from the continuous tax increases needed to
sustain the advance of social security contributions has prompted, in
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TABLE I.6
CURRENT AND CAPITAL TRANSFERS DELIVERED BY
THE STATE TO OTHER GENERAL GOVERNMENT SECTORS
% of GDP
Current transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.8 9.1 8.9 9.1 10.1 11.3 11.1
Central government
Administrative agencies. . . . . 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6
Social Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 4.6 4.4 4.5 4.9 5.9 5.8
INEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.6 1.4
Autonomous Communities. . . . . 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.1 3.1
Share in State revenue . . . . . . 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.7 2.4 2.9 2.9
Local governments. . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6
Share in State revenue . . . . . . 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.6
Capital transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.6 0.6
Central government
administrative agencies. . . . . 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2
Social Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.1
INEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .— — 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.0
Autonomous Communities. . . . . 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3
Local governments. . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
1994199319921991199019891988
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
1995, a lowering of the contribution rates which could bring to a halt the
upward trend in this revenue in recent years.
Part of the buoyancy in revenue as a whole is attributable to devel-
opments in the “other revenue and transfers” caption. From 1987 to
1994, the weight of this item in GDP increased by 0.7 percentage
points, reaching 4.6 percentage points in 1994. This growth is due to
dividend proceeds related to capital gains arising on the privatisation
of certain State-owned companies (those belonging to INH – the Na-
tional Hydrocarbons Institute – ) and to the exceptionally high profits of
the Banco de España in 1992 and 1993. Insofar as the factors behind
this increase are non-recurrent or one-off, the 0.7 percentage points in-
crease in terms of GDP may be affirmed to be temporary. That will
have a bearing on the future sustainability of the current revenue/GDP
ratio. The risks, then, of a greater overrun in the budget deficit once
these temporary-improvement factors disappear or weaken – as has
begun to occur in 1994 and 1995 – are therefore high, and mean the
drive to reduce the deficit via the containment of spending must be in-
t e n s i f i e d .
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CHART I.5
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
GENERAL GOVERNMENT LEVELS
see chart I.5
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
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Turning to capital revenue, its rise by 0.6 percentage points of GDP
from 1987 to 1994 is due entirely to the increase in transfers from the EU.
Once again, this is an uncertain and relatively uncontrollable factor, par-
ticularly as regards the cohesion funds, the receiving of which may be
conditional, in principle, upon meeting the targets set in convergence pro-
grammes.
On analysing the contribution of the various agents to the growth of
the budget deficit (which increased by 3.6 percentage points of GDP be-
tween 1987 and 1994, as shown in Table I.2), the State (i.e. central gov-
ernment excluding government agencies), with a contribution of 1.6
points of GDP, is seen as the agent to have pursued the most expansion-
ary policy. That said, territorial (regional and local) governments, with 1.2
points of GDP, and Social Security Funds, with 0.8 points, together con-
tribute over 50 % of the increase in the budget imbalance. In any event,
this apparently more expansionary behaviour of the State and its agen-
cies is indicative of the problems of excessive growth in spending and of
the lack of budgetary discipline in the general government sector as a
whole. Such problems are more intensely manifest in the State sector
CHART I.6
PUBLIC INVESTMENT
GENERAL GOVERNMENT LEVELS
see chart I.6
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
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since the other agents depend on transfers from the State. As Table I.6
reveals, current and capital transfers delivered by the State to other gen-
eral government sectors respectively account in 1994 for 11.1 and 0.6
points of GDP. The former have increased since 1988 by 2.3 points of
GDP, while the latter have slid by 0.4 points of GDP since the same year.
The decline of capital transfers was centred on 1994, when their share in
GDP fell by a point. Under this increase by 1.9 points of GDP in total
transfers, 74 % corresponded to Social Security Funds and 21 % to the
“Autonomous Communities” (regional governments). If the contributions
of the various agents to the growth of the budget deficit are weighted tak-
ing into account the interplay of transfers received by the State, the prob-
TABLE I.7
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT
BREAKDOWN BY AGENT
% of GDP
Government consumption15.1 14.8 15.2 15.6 16.2 17.0 17.5 17.0
Percentage shares
Central government. . . . 66.9 66.1 66.0 64.0 63.2 63.8 63.8 63.1
State + Central
Gvt. Administrative
A g e n c i e s . . . . . . . . . .45.6 43.2 41.6 39.6 38.2 36.7 37.4 36.4
Social Security . . . . . . . 21.2 22.9 24.3 24.4 25.0 27.1 26.5 26.7
Territorial
governments. . . . . . . . 33.1 33.9 34.0 36.0 36.8 36.2 36.2 36.9
Autonomous
Communities . . . . . . 16.5 16.8 17.2 18.1 18.4 18.5 18.4 18.7
Local governments . . . 16.7 17.2 16.9 17.9 18.4 17.7 17.8 18.2
Public investment. . . . . . 3.4 3.8 4.4 5.0 4.9 4.2 4.2 3.9
Percentage shaes
Central government. . . . 37.8 37.8 38.2 39.5 39.1 35.9 40.4 38.6
State + Central
Gvt. Administrative
Agencies. . . . . . . . . .32.3 32.7 32.0 33.6 33.0 30.1 34.5 33.1
Social Security . . . . . . . 5.5 5.1 6.2 6.0 6.0 5.8 5.9 5.5
Territorial
governments. . . . . . . . 62.2 62.2 61.8 60.5 60.9 64.1 59.6 61.4
Autonomous
Communities . . . . . . 31.7 31.1 31.0 30.8 35.1 36.3 34.6 34.9
Local governments . . . 30.6 31.1 30.8 29.6 25.8 27.9 25.1 26.4
19941993199219911990198919881987
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
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lem of the budget deficit is confirmed to be one of the general govern-
ment sector as a whole. And noteworthy thereunder as the sub-sector
with most difficulties is Social Security Funds, coinciding with the fact that
welfare benefits are the spending component that has most increased rel-
atively in recent years.
It is no accident that the biggest increase in the State deficit should
coincide with the economic recession. Indeed, if the State deficit reflects
the problems of the general government sector as a whole, this is all the
more so at times of recession. The reason lies, first, in the cyclical insen-
sitivity of the revenue and expenditure of the Autonomous Communities
(State transfers to the regional governments are little affected by the cy-
cle); and second, in the bigger transfers the State makes to Social Secu-
rity Funds so that the latter may cover the shortfall arising between bene-
fits, which increase (unemployment benefits in particular), and
contributions, which slow down as a result of employment developments.
Thus, up to 1992, the increase in the budget deficit by 1.1 points of GDP
since 1987 was due in its entirety to the contribution of Social Security
Funds (one point of GDP) and of the territorial governments (1.3 points of
TABLE I.8
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT
Rate of change by agent
Government consumption. . . . . 8.7 15.3 14.4 13.7 12.9 6.4 3.0
Central government. . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 15.1 11.0 12.1 14.0 6.4 1.9
State + Central
Gvt. Administrative Agencies . 2.9 11.1 8.9 9.5 8.5 8.3 0.3
Social Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . .17.0 22.7 14.7 16.3 22.5 3.9 4.1
Territorial governments. . . . . . . . 11.3 15.7 20.9 16.4 10.9 6.4 5.0
Autonomous Communities . . . 10.6 18.1 20.3 16.1 13.0 6.0 4.7
Local governments . . . . . . . . . . 12.0 13.2 21.4 16.8 8.8 6.7 5.4
Public investment. . . . . . . . . . . . .23.7 29.7 26.3 7.2 –8.9 4.4 –2.6
Central government. . . . . . . . . . . 23.8 31.0 30.7 5.9 –16.3 17.5 –6.9
State + Central
Gvt. Administrative Agencies . 25.3 27.2 32.3 5.5 –17.0 19.7 –6.5
Social Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . .15.1 55.4 22.5 8.3 –12.7 6.3 –9.0
Territorial governments. . . . . . . . 23.7 28.8 23.6 8.1 –4.2 –2.9 0.2
Autonomous Communities . . . 21.7 29.0 25.7 22.1 –5.9 –0.4 –1.6
Local governments . . . . . . . . . . 25.7 28.7 21.4 –6.5 –1.8 –6.1 2.8
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Nominal GDP growth. . . . . . . . . 11.2 12.2 11.3 9.5 7.5 3.2 6.2
1994199319921991199019891988
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
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GDP), while the State deficit declined by 1.2 points of GDP over the
same period.
This conclusion is bolstered when the nominal growth of final demand
(of government consumption and public investment) in the various gener-
al government agents is observed (Charts I.5 and I.6, and Table I.7). In
principle, there appear to have been no major variations in the relative
weights of the various general government agents. Hence, under govern-
ment consumption, a slight rise is perceptible in the relative weight of ter-
ritorial governments, which might be due to the headway made in trans-
ferring powers to the Autonomous Communities. Such headway is in
contrast to the decline in the investment role played by the territorial gov-
ernments, which is entirely in response to a lesser investment drive by lo-
cal g o v e r n m e n t s. Noteworthy under central government is the strong
growth of government consumption by Social Security Funds, the weight of
which in the total is more than five percentage points up, a fact which ac-
counts for 60 % of the increase in the government consumption/GDP ratio.
Table I.8 shows the nominal growths of government consumption and
public investment. It can be seen that the relative stability of their shares
masks differing trends. Specifically, as regards government consumption,
it is Social Security Funds and the territorial governments which, with the
exception of 1993, evidence most growth; in all years except 1994, the
surging growth of consumption by these sectors outstripped nominal
GDP growth. Turning to public investment, the State and the territorial
governments (Social Security Funds has a residual investor weight) show
similar behaviour, expanding strongly between 1988 and 1990, and con-
tracting between 1991 and 1994. In 1993, however, they follow different
courses: whereas the Autonomous Communities show a certain modera-
tion, the State is seen to heighten its investment drive, with nominal
growth at almost 20 %. In short, both the role of the State, as the distribu-
tion pivot for funds or transfers, and the expansion of government con-
sumption in non-central governments confirm that the heavy deterioration
of the State deficit is but the reflection of the problems existing in the gen-
eral government sector as a whole.
It may thus be concluded that from 1988 to 1994 there was an in-
tense worsening of the budgetary imbalance. The deterioration was par-
ticularly notable in 1993, with 1994 marking the start of a modest correc-
tion. True, part of the deterioration was due to the impact of the crisis on
the course of general government revenue and expenditure. But undoubt-
edly reflected too is a permanent increase in public spending, under-
pinned by the extension of welfare-state entitlement spending. This trend
was in contrast to that in the rest of the EU, where it is essentially the fall
in revenue (caused by various fiscal reforms) that is behind the widening
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tendency of the budget deficit in recent years. In Spain, indeed, public
revenue is increasing, albeit by an insufficient amount to prevent the
widening of the budget deficit.
Leaving aside the impact of the crisis, there is one key fact relating to
public revenue and expenditure that may affect the possibility of correct-
ing and even containing the budget deficit in the coming years. Namely,
while the increase in public spending is of a permanent nature (since it is
largely attributable to the extension of entitlement spending), the rise in
revenue is transitory and uncertain, as over 30 % of this increase was not
due to tax rises but to circumstances that were extraordinary (dividend
revenue related to the privatisation of certain State-owned companies or
the exceptionally high profits of the Banco de España in 1992 and 1993)
or uncontrollable (the rise in transfers received from the EU, which may
be partly linked to compliance with the objectives of national convergence
programmes). Thus, in 1994 the recovery in tax revenue did not prevent
a decline in total revenue, as a percentage of GDP, owing primarily to the
fall in resources arising from the profits of the Banco de España. This
particular combination (permanent increases in spending and transitory –
in part – increases in revenue) advises extreme rigour in controlling pub-
lic spending if a further widening of the deficit is to be avoided in the com-
ing years(2).
(2) Significant in this respect is the State deficit in 1994. A slight budgetary deviation
occurred which, unlike previous years, came about on the revenue side since the forecasts
for privatisation proceeds were not met and a large portion of the capital transfers from EU
funds were delayed. The cut in spending in relation to the initial budget projection was un-
able to offset these revenue deviations.
II
FISCAL POLICY STANCE
The previous chapter analysed the behaviour of government revenue
and expenditure captions. This chapter analyses the stance of fiscal poli-
cy and, concretely, strives to evaluate whether fiscal policy has had a sta-
bilising effect at the macroeconomic level. This is not an obvious ques-
tion, because fiscal policy not only affects activity but is also automatically
affected by it via both spending and revenue.
On the expenditure side, although unemployment benefits should be
the only item with pronounced cyclical sensitivity, other expenditure com-
ponents can, in fact, show a certain cyclical sensitivity. In this respect,
though there is no reason why pension payments should depend on the
economy’s cyclical position, the fact is that recession, with the job de-
struction it engenders, encourages early retirement. This is due not only
to the greater difficulty in finding employment but also to the launch of
corporate reconversion programmes, in which the most frequent job-leav-
ing incentives involve severance payments and early retirement
schemes. Similarly, benefits such as payments for temporary labour dis-
ability and provisional invalidity (which should depend solely on industrial
accidents) exhibit a certain cyclical pattern, since they are sometimes
used by firms as a way of temporarily adjusting staffing levels and, con-
sequently, as a means of coping with the impact of recession on corpo-
rate profits. Even interest payments on debt can be affected to some ex-
tent – albeit in a different direction and depending on many other
circumstances – by cyclical trends in the economy, insofar as recession
is associated with lower nominal and real interest rates, and expansion-
ary periods with higher rates.
On the revenue side, the problem is that not all taxes show the same
cyclical sensitivity: whereas corporate and personal income taxes are
highly sensitive (evidenced in the elasticity of takings to nominal GDP,
which is higher than unity), taxes on consumption, such as VAT and ex-
cise duties, are generally cyclically neutral, with the exception of the im-
pact of the change in the composition of aggregate demand and the influ-
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ence of the business cycle on consumer tax evasion (such that the elas-
ticity of their takings is about unity in relation to nominal GDP). Moreover,
these elasticities of taxes to business also vary over time, either as a re-
sult of regulatory changes or of more effective tax implementation (a
greater degree of fiscal compliance or improvements in tax administra-
tion, for example).
A further problem when analysing the discretionary component of fis-
cal policy – the change in revenue and expenditure – is that it is difficult
to calculate the economic impact of specific legislative measures over
time. This is due to the time lag in their effects and also to the reactions
caused by the anticipation of regulatory changes, which operate through
the expectations of economic agents. Thus, the increase in the entitle-
ment of individuals to receive unemployment benefits, a legislative mea-
sure taken in 1989, had no significant discretionary impact until the slow-
down in activity became a crude reality. Fiscal policy was discretionarily
expansionary in 1989, even though its impact on public spending – re-
flected in the composite indicators of fiscal policy – would not become ap-
parent until years later. By contrast, the announced modification in the
compatibility of severance payments for dismissals and unemployment
benefits (proposed in parliament in the autumn of 1993 for enforcement in
early 1994 but later withdrawn) was unquestionably a factor in the rise in
the number of dismissals at the time.
Briefly stated, in a simplified and summary analysis it is difficult to pin-
point whether a change in fiscal policy is discretionary or automatic. Due
to the problems posed in calculating and evaluating the cyclical compo-
nent over time (which is hard to estimate if, for example, discretionary
measures also alter the cyclical sensitivity of revenue and expenditure), it
is difficult to give a precise answer to the question of what the fiscal policy
stance is at any given time. This study uses two evaluation methods that
seem to act more as complements than as alternatives. First, in this
chapter, the composite indicators of fiscal policy stance (concretely, the
fiscal impulse indicators proposed by the IMF) are analysed to evaluate
whether fiscal policy has had a stabilising effect. Second, in Appendix 1,
the main discretionary measures taken in recent years are examined in
detail, and a more specific evaluation is made of the discretionary compo-
nents implicit in the different revenue and expenditure captions.
II.1. Fiscal impulse in Spain: 1988-1994
In seeking to ascertain and measure, as far as is possible, the con-
tractionary or expansionary impulse of fiscal policy, one of the first prob-
lems encountered is the endogeneity of fiscal policy with respect to the
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business cycle. This endogeneity invalidates the use of the current bud-
get balance as a reliable indicator of discretionary government action, be-
cause the budget is affected by trends in economic activity which, as a
general rule, do not coincide with initial forecasts. This dependence is the
product of the higher-than-unity elasticity of several components of rev-
enue (direct taxation) and expenditure (mainly unemployment benefits)
that make up the well-known mechanism of automatic stabilisers.
This chapter uses a fiscal policy indicator that, by adjusting the vari-
ables of government revenue and expenditure for the effect of the busi-
ness cycle, reflects the stance of fiscal policy and, thus, the reaction of
the economic authorities to changes in the economic climate, while also
signalling the likely behaviour of future fiscal policy in the light of its cur-
rent stance. The indicator used is that of fiscal impulse, based on the
methodology developed by the IMF(1). A positive fiscal impulse signifies
a discretionarily contractionary policy stance, and vice versa in the case
of a negative impulse.
Table II.1 shows the calculation of this indicator for the whole of the
general government sector from 1988 to 1994. An initial conclusion that
can be drawn from this table is that the fiscal policy stance was expan-
sionary in the period in question, with the exception of 1992 and 1994,
when it was contractionary. The slightly contractionary nature of fiscal
policy in 1989 is solely due to the transfer of more than PTA 300 billion
(the equivalent of 0.7 percentage points of GDP) in personal income tax
refunds to the year 1990. If adjusted for this effect, the resulting figure in-
dicates an expansionary impulse in fiscal policy in 1989 and also an eas-
ing in fiscal expansion in 1990.
As to the efforts to control the budget deficit in 1992, the impact was
greater than that derived from the modest reduction in the budget imbal-
ance, which decreased by only 0.7 points of GDP, prompted by the inten-
sification of the slowdown in economic activity that began in 1989. For
1993, the use of this indicator confirms that the surge in the budget deficit
that year by more than 3 points of GDP can only be partly explained by
the impact of the recession, which accounted for 30 % of the aforemen-
tioned increase. The deterioration in the budget imbalance in 1993 must
therefore be attributed to a change in the stance of fiscal policy, which
undermined the consolidation process and led to a short-term expansion-
ary impulse that added to the business cycle’s automatic impact on gov-
ernment accounts. In 1993 the need to correct the budget deficit became
a secondary concern, because the priority was to counteract the adverse
effects of the recession by increasing public spending. In 1994 fiscal poli-
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( 1 ) For a more detailed description of this and other indicators, see A.L. Gómez
Jiménez (1993).
cy resumed the contractionary path embarked upon in 1992, although ef-
forts fell far short of those in 1992: despite a notably higher rate of eco-
nomic growth, the budget deficit was reduced by a similar amount.
If we examine the fiscal impulse associated with the primary deficit
(i.e. excluding interest payments, which depend on previous years’ fiscal
policy and not that of the current year), the result is similar. Taking into
account the correction in 1989 and 1990, fiscal policy remained expan-
sionary throughout the period considered, except in 1992 and 1994.
Moreover, the fiscal impulse estimated for the primary deficit clearly re-
veals the change in the fiscal policy stance in 1993, marked by an unde-
niably more expansionary impulse than in the other years in question.
Another feature of fiscal policy is reflected in the breakdown of fiscal
impulse into its revenue and expenditure components. If the effects of the
transfer of personal income tax refunds from 1989 to 1990 are stripped
out, revenue is seen to have a permanently contractionary impact be-
tween 1989 and 1992. Notably, in 1992 the impact of personal income
tax reforms was more than offset by the rise in indirect taxes and, there-
fore, the contractionary impulse of revenue was second only to that of
1989 (when, moreover, the year’s result was due to the aforementioned
transfer of tax refunds). In 1993 the neutral behaviour of revenue is at-
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TABLE II.1
FISCAL IMPULSE INDICATOR (IMF). GENERAL GOVERNMENT
% of GDP
Deficit (a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–3.3 –2.8 –4.1 –4.9 –4.2 –7.5 –6.7
Change in deficit. . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.1 0.5 –1.3 –0.8 0.7 –3.3 0.8
Fiscal impulse (b). . . . . . . . . . . . –0.4 0.2 –1.5 –0.7 1.1 –2.3 0.7
Fiscal impulse revenue (b). . . . –0.0 1.9 –0.2 0.8 1.7 0.0 –0.6
Fiscal impulse expenditure (c).0.4 1.8 1.3 1.6 0.6 2.3 –1.2
Cyclical effect. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.3 0.2 –0.1 –0.4 –1.1 0.2
Primary deficit (d). . . . . . . . . . . . 0.1 0.7 –0.4 –1.0 0.0 –2.2 –1.4
Change in primary deficit. . . . . –0.2 0.6 –1.0 –0.6 1.0 –2.3 0.9
Primary fiscal impulse (b). . . . . –0.5 0.3 –1.2 –0.5 1.3 –1.3 0.7
MEMORANDUM ITEMS:
Real GDP growth. . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 4.7 3.7 2.2 0.7 –1.1 2.0
Output gap (e). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.5 1.2 1.6 1.5 0.5 –1.9 –1.5
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Banco de España and own calculation.
(a) Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–).
(b) A plus sign denotes a contractionary stance.
(c) A plus sign denotes an expansionary stance.
(d) Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–), excluding interest payments.
(e) Output gap = (GDP – potential GDP)/GDP (%) in real terms.
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
tributable not so much to measures involving tax cuts as to certain distor-
tions that the elimination of intra-Community customs introduced into VAT
takings; this effect was automatic in that it obviously bore no relation to
the business cycle, nor did it reflect a fiscal policy decision taken by the
authorities. This generally contractionary contribution of government rev-
enue, not only in recent years but also historically, underwent a change in
1994: yet even then the incidence of a non-discretionary factor – the Ban-
co de España’s return to normal profit levels – played a key role.
Throughout the years in question, the main characteristic of expendi-
ture was its expansionary impulse, a tendency that became more pro-
nounced as from 1988. In addition to the change in the stance of fiscal
policy in 1993, there was another feature that was initially hidden in the
budget balance: the discretionary increase in government spending as
from 1989. Even in a year as clearly contractionary as 1992, the expan-
sionary component in expenditure was greater than in 1988. This expan-
sionary tendency in public spending was curbed in 1994, although the
year’s restrictive efforts can be judged insufficient, taking into account the
powerful impulse of a discretionary nature to government expenditure in
1993.
In short, the indicator of fiscal policy stance confirms that, in the peri-
od in question, and with the exception of 1992 and 1994, fiscal policy ex-
erted a systematically expansionary impulse that tended to exacerbate in-
flationary tensions during the cycle’s upturn but apparently failed to
mitigate the rate of decline in activity during the recession. The ultimate
source of this fiscal policy stance was the process of expansionary ex-
penditure that began in 1989 and whose impact on the structural deficit
could not be offset by the contractionary measures taken on the revenue
side. Against this backdrop, the effect of the business cycle (positive from
1988 to 1990, neutral in 1991, negative in 1992 and even more negative
in 1993) determined the behaviour of the budget balance: stabilisation
from 1988 to 1990, and increasing deterioration from 1991 onwards. In
1994, coinciding with the start of a fresh stage of economic recovery, the
structural deficit was reduced very slightly, remaining at notably high lev-
els. Within this medium-term stance, two years stand out as exceptional:
1992, when the tendency to overrun the deficit was checked, and 1993,
when the budget deficit was clearly overshot. These abrupt changes in
fiscal policy from one year to the next underscore the need to analyse
medium-term trends – thereby cancelling out short-term distortions – and
also the advisability of subjecting fiscal policy to medium-term objectives,
within the framework of a comprehensive and coherent economic pro-
gramme.
So far the indicator referring to the whole of general government has
been applied. But it would also be worthwhile analysing separately the
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contractionary or expansionary nature of the fiscal policy of general gov-
ernment agents. However, before discussing the results by agent, which
are shown in Table II.2, several observations are in order. First, trends in
activity have a greater effect on central government than on territorial
governments, primarily because of the financing structure of the au-
tonomous communities (regional governments)(2). In short, the fiscal im-
pulse of the autonomous communities tends to overestimate the discre-
tionary component of their fiscal policy in boom years – and, thus, these
territorial agents seem to exert a more expansionary impulse – and to un-
derestimate this component during recession. Second, the construction of
this indicator for each agent does not allow us to obtain the same indica-
tor for the whole of general government via the sum of the indicators of its
individual agents, due to the asymmetric computation of the discretionary
component in revenue and expenditure. Accordingly, the results of this in-
dicator by agent should be interpreted with caution and should, in any
event, be viewed more from a qualitative than from a quantitative stand-
point. Lastly, as already noted, the problems of the whole of general gov-
ernment are eventually reflected in the State deficit. In sum, the analysis
by agent introduces a bias against the State in the figures for central gov-
ernment by exaggerating the expansionary impact of its fiscal policy.
In any case, even taking these considerations into account, the re-
sults of the analysis of the fiscal impulse of general government agents
are still interesting. The findings confirm that, from 1988 to 1991, the fis-
cal expansion of both territorial and central governments was similar. Be-
tween 1992 and 1994, territorial governments restrained their fiscal poli-
cy, whereas central government agents, after a contractionary policy in
1992, returned to a very expansionary policy in 1993, which they correct-
ed somewhat in 1994 through slightly contractionary measures. A general
interpretation of the evidence in Table II.2 allows us to conclude that, just
as territorial governments – and, specifically, autonomous communities –
were the co-protagonists of fiscal expansion from 1988 to 1991, their be-
haviour in the three subsequent years was contractionary. In 1993 this
behaviour stands in contrast to the expansionary stance of the State. As
noted earlier, the problems of the whole of general government are even-
tually reflected in the State budget. In this respect, the autonomous com-
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(2) Specifically, we refer to financing via transfers from the State and to the fact that
most transfers (those related to participation in State revenue) are subject to a ceiling (the
nominal GDP growth rate) and a minimum (growth in what are known as equivalent State
expenses). Thus, during recession, part of the revenue of autonomous communities grows
at the rate of public spending at the State level, and, in expansionary periods, when growth
in State revenue surpasses that of GDP because of the higher-than-unity elasticity of tak-
ings, their revenue grows at the same rate as GDP. This indicates that their revenue is less
dependent on the economic cycle, and, since unemployment payments are outside their
sphere of responsibilities, their deficit is less sensitive to the cycle.
munities’ moderate behaviour in 1993 contrasts with the surge in State
transfers to these agents.
The analysis using fiscal impulse as a starting point has so far fo-
cused on the medium-term trends in fiscal policy from 1988 to 1993.
However, it would also be interesting to study the changes in fiscal poli-
cy in the very short run to ascertain whether fiscal policy has a stabilis-
ing effect in the short run or whether, on the contrary, it is characterised
by high volatility, with the potential for distortion that this would repre-
sent. To analyse this possibility, a quarterly indicator of fiscal policy
stance was prepared from the cash-basis data of the State budget (ex-
cluding interest payments due to their strong volatility), whose findings
are given in Table II.3.
After analysing the figures in Table II.3, our main conclusion is that
the pattern of behaviour of fiscal policy was very volatile over the course
of each year and also differed sharply from one year to another. Thus, in
1988 the expansionary impact of fiscal policy mainly occurred in the third
quarter, whereas in 1989 fiscal policy was expansionary in the first half of
the year and contractionary in the second half. In 1990 the third quarter
was again the most expansionary, while 1991 witnessed an abrupt swing
from a very contractionary third quarter to a very expansionary fourth
quarter. In 1992 and to an even greater degree in 1993, fiscal policy was
increasingly expansionary, more as a result of trends in expenditure than
in revenue. In 1994 fiscal policy made its most clearly contractionary con-
tribution in the final quarter, based on expenditure control. The contribu-
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TABLE II.2
FISCAL IMPULSE INDICATOR (IMF) ( a )
GENERAL GOVERNMENT LEVELS
% of GFDP
1988 –3.3 –0.1 –0.4 –2.9 0.2 –0.0 –0.3 –0.4 –0.4 –0.3 –0.3 –0.4 –0.0 –0.0 –0.1
1989 –2.8 0.5 0.2 –2.0 0.9 0.7 –0.8 –0.5 –0.6 –0.6 –0.3 –0.3 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2
1990 –4.1 –1.3 –1.5 –3.1 –1.1 –1.3 –1.0 –0.2 –0.3 –0.8 –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 0.0 –0.0
1991 –4.9 –0.8 –0.7 –3.3 –0.2 –0.1 –1.6 –0.6 –0.6 –1.4 –0.6 –0.6 –0.2 –0.0 –0.0
1992 –4.2 0.7 1.1 –3.0 0.3 0.6 –1.2 0.4 0.5 –1.0 0.4 0.5 –0.2 0.0 0.1
1993 –7.5 –3.3 –2.3 –6.2 –3.2 –2.3 –1.3 –0.1 0.1 –1.1 –0.1 0.0 –0.2 0.0 0.2
1994 –6.7 0.8 0.7 –5.6 0.6 0.5 –1.1 0.2 0.2 –1.0 0.2 0.2 –0.1 0.0 0.0
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Banco de España and own calculation.
(a) A plus sign denotes a contractionary stance.
(b) Net lending (+) or net borrowing (–).
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tions of both expenditure and revenue were highly volatile, as reflected in
their variation coefficient, albeit much lower than that of the balance. As
to the cyclical effect, it provides a perfect reflection of the increasing im-
pact of the slowdown in activity on the budget deficit, peaking in the sec-
ond quarter of 1993.
From the analysis of the quarterly indicator, the following conclusions
can be drawn: first, the stance of fiscal policy has been considerably
volatile over the course of each year; second, this volatility is explained
by trends in both revenue and expenditure; third, this strong volatility may
have had a highly distorting impact; lastly, fiscal policy, due to the volatili-
ty in its stance, undoubtedly heightened economic agents’ uncertainty,
since the signals emitted were difficult to interpret in terms of the future
course of fiscal policy.
To summarise, in this chapter, the stance of fiscal policy – its contrac-
tionary or expansionary nature – from 1988 to 1994 has been analysed
by constructing composite indicators. It arrives at the following conclu-
sions:
— In the period in question, fiscal policy has been characterised by
an expansionary stance that tended to exacerbate the imbalances
in the economy during the boom years of the cycle. The first year
that was marked by contractionary behaviour in fiscal policy
(1992) was followed by a year of strong expansion, reflecting a
shift in fiscal policy priorities due to the recession. This expansion-
ary impulse was corrected slightly in 1994, as a fresh upturn in the
business cycle began.
— The disaggregated analysis of revenue and expenditure confirms
the expansionary nature of spending from 1988 to 1993, which fis-
cal contraction on the revenue side failed to offset.
— In terms of agents, the expansionary policy in the period 1988-
1991 and the contractionary policy in 1992 were not only driven by
central government but also by territorial governments. Nonethe-
less, the fiscal expansion in 1993 was driven by central govern-
ment, since the behaviour of territorial governments was slightly
contractionary. However, this characteristic of 1993 should be in-
terpreted with caution, in view of the intense growth in transfers
from the State to autonomous communities during the year. In
1994 the fiscal policy stance of both types of agent was moderate-
ly contractionary.
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TABLE II.3
FISCAL IMPULSE INDICATOR (IMF). STATE (a)
% of quarterly GDP
1988-I –0.6 1.5 1.3 0.1 –1.2 0.3 0.5
1988-II 0.9 3.3 3.1 3.6 0.5 0.2 0.7
1988-III 0.5 –1.7 –1.8 –1.3 0.4 0.1 0.6
1988-IV –0.8 0.5 0.4 –0.9 –1.3 0.1 0.7
1989-I –2.4 –1.8 –1.9 0.0 1.9 0.1 0.9
1989-II –1.5 –2.3 –2.5 –2.7 –0.2 0.1 1.2
1989-III 2.8 2.3 2.2 3.3 1.1 0.2 1.5
1989-IV 5.3 6.1 5.9 4.9 –1.0 0.2 1.7
1990-I –0.0 2.3 2.1 –0.6 –2.7 0.2 1.8
1990-II 0.5 2.0 1.9 1.8 –0.1 0.1 1.8
1990-III –3.2 –6.0 –6.1 –5.7 0.4 0.1 1.8
1990-IV 4.7 –0.7 –0.7 1.3 2.0 0.0 1.8
1991-I –0.6 –0.6 –0.5 1.1 1.7 –0.0 1.7
1991-II –0.6 –1.1 –1.0 0.9 1.9 –0.0 1.6
1991-III 3.4 6.6 6.6 4.1 –2.6 –0.0 1.7
1991-IV –0.6 –5.3 –5.3 –5.4 –0.1 –0.0 1.7
1992-I –2.7 –2.1 –2.1 –0.8 1.3 –0.0 1.6
1992-II –1.1 –0.6 –0.5 –0.5 0.0 –0.1 1.2
1992-III 1.3 –2.1 –1.9 –1.1 0.8 –0.2 0.5
1992-IV 3.3 4.0 4.4 3.7 –0.6 –0.4 –0.5
1993-I –1.0 1.6 2.2 0.6 –1.6 –0.5 –1.2
1993-II –2.2 –1.1 –0.5 0.5 1.0 –0.6 –1.8
1993-III –2.6 –3.9 –3.4 –1.7 1.7 –0.5 –2.1
1993-IV –3.1 –6.4 –6.1 0.5 6.6 –0.3 –2.1
1994-I 0.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 0.1 –0.1 –1.7
1994-II –2.3 –0.1 –0.2 –0.7 –0.6 0.1 –1.4
1994-III –1.6 1.0 0.8 –0.6 –1.4 0.2 –1.1
1994-IV –0.6 2.4 2.2 –3.8 –5.9 0.2 –0.8
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
V.C. (f) 100.9 24.2 28.5
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Banco de España and own calculation.
(a) In cash-basis terms.
(b) Year-on-year change.
(c) A plus sign denotes a contractionary stance.
(d) A plus sign denotes an expansionary stance.
(e) GAP = (GDP – potential GDP)/GDP (%) in real terms.
(f) Variation coefficient = Standard deviation/mean.
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— Lastly, the analysis confirms the high volatility in the stance of fis-
cal policy, on both the revenue and expenditure sides. Such
volatility may have had highly distorting effects because of its ad-
verse impact on economic agents’ uncertainty.
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III
THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF FISCAL POLICY
Fiscal policy exerts either a moderating or expansionary effect on the
aggregate demand of the economy. And depending on the degree of flex-
ibility or rigidity of supply, capacity utilisation, etc., this pressure will feed
through partly to real growth and partly to prices. As it is difficult to distin-
guish between the impact on prices and the real impact, since this would
require a complex analysis of the effects of fiscal policy or a significantly
subjective value judgment, this dimension of the problem is not ad-
dressed in the present chapter. Here our analysis will simply point out the
existence of possible inflationary pressures – measured in terms of the
growth in public spending and effective general government demand –
and, with a descriptive approach, offer several general observations on
the potential impact of these pressures on price trends.
Another aspect that must be considered is the incidence that fiscal
policy may have on the economy’s external imbalance, both directly (via
the impact of the budget deficit on the nation’s net borrowing) and indi-
rectly (via the effect of fiscal policy on competitiveness). Here again, the
purpose is not to discern, for example, whether the twin-deficit hypothesis
holds in the Spanish case, but rather to make several general observa-
tions on the possible impact of fiscal policy on the current-account bal-
ance. In particular, it would be interesting to know whether the apparent
lack of any connection between the current-account deficit and the bud-
get deficit in 1993 – when, despite a considerable increase in the budget
deficit, the balance on current account moved close to equilibrium – is a
feature that could persist in subsequent years or whether, on the con-
trary, the process of economic recovery entails an increasing impact of
the budget deficit on the current-account deficit.
One final aspect of fiscal policy at the macroeconomic level is its
credibility, i.e. the effect that the uncertainty generated by fiscal policy, via
the expected behaviour of expenditure and taxes, may have on the be-
haviour of economic agents. Among other features, Spanish fiscal policy
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is characterised by systematic deviations from forecasts that are only
partly attributable to the uncertainty surrounding the course of economic
activity. In this respect, the deterioration in the implementation of fiscal
policy in the years in question is clearly evidenced first in the Conver-
gence Programme of mid-1992, conditioned by notably optimistic fore-
casts of the economy’s real growth; and further, in the State budget for
1993, when the budget deficit, at 5.6 % of GDP, more than doubled the
initial forecast of 2.3 % of GDP. The fact that, in both cases, the intensity
of the recession was greater than initially forecast does not in itself ex-
plain the failure to fulfil the fiscal policy objectives in the first Convergence
Programme or to meet the State budget objectives in 1993.
In short, this chapter will discuss, in a succinct and summary fashion,
the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy. It will specifically address how
fiscal policy influences inflation, the current-account deficit and economic
agents’ uncertainty.
III.1. Fiscal policy and inflation
Chapter I examined the expansionary nature of fiscal policy in the
years 1988 to 1994 (with the exception of 1992 and 1994) and how pub-
lic spending acted as the single driving force behind this expansionary
behaviour. But this general description of fiscal policy in the period in
question actually covers two very different sub-periods, one marked by
very robust economic growth in the years 1988, 1989 and 1990, and an-
other reflecting the increasing slowdown in the economy that culminated
in the deep-seated recession of 1993 and the subsequent recovery dur-
ing 1994. At the macroeconomic level, the impact of the expansionary
impulse of fiscal policy may have differed in each of these sub-periods.
In this respect, the main problem created by the expansionary nature
of fiscal policy in the boom period was that it led to an unbalanced mone-
tary/fiscal policy mix. Indeed, due to the expansionary and pro-cyclical
nature of fiscal policy, monetary policy had to act almost single-handedly
to contain the inflationary pressures generated by the buoyancy of eco-
nomic growth; and this, coupled with the significant structural rigidities in
the Spanish economy and the absence of a sufficiently energetic reform
policy to combat them, exacted a very high price in terms of efficiency.
Thus, this policy mix had a greater impact on tradeable goods (precisely
the least inflationary sector) than on non-tradeable goods (the most infla-
tionary sector, due to the greater market power derived from the lack of
foreign competition and scant competition at home). This resulted in
problems of dual inflation and a lack of competitiveness and also led to a
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redistribution in favour of the more inflationary productive sectors, with
lower productivity gains and, by extension, less growth potential.
After the period of intense economic growth and the onset of a sub-
stantial slowdown in activity, the lack of a correction in the structural
deficit – which had, in fact, increased during the boom period, coinciding
with the growing budget deficit of a cyclical nature – began to have direct
consequences on the medium-term sustainability of the fiscal policy
stance then in place. Thus, apart from the aforementioned impact on dual
inflation and the external sector, in itself the growth in the public
debt/GDP ratio in preceding years made it essential to effect a far-reach-
ing and rapid correction in the structural deficit (1).
This chapter provides a descriptive analysis of the inflationary pres-
sures that fiscal policy may have exerted in recent years. One character-
istic feature that can be deduced from the growth rates in public spending
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CHART III.1
PUBLIC SPENDING AND AGGREGATE DEMAND (a)
see chart III.1
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
(a) Percentage change.
(b) Current prices.
(1) For a more detailed analysis of the problem of the sustainability of public debt, see
González-Páramo, Roldán and Sebastián (1992).
and national demand since 1976 (Chart III.1) is that growth in expenditure
was systematically higher (except in the three-year period 1986-1988 and
in 1994) than that in demand. From a long-term perspective, public
spending has undoubtedly exerted pressure on supply, which possibly
had an upward impact on prices.
Insofar as the bulk of public spending consists of transfers to house-
holds and firms, financed from taxes in turn imposed on (other) house-
holds and firms, the potentially inflationary effects of this intense growth
in expenditure will depend on the characteristics of the income redistribu-
tion induced by public spending. Thus, in general, the greater the redistri-
bution effect, the greater the potential impact of this spending increase on
inflation. Accordingly, if lower-income households show a higher marginal
propensity to consume, or are subject to liquidity constraints, this income
redistribution induced by public spending and taxes will increase private
consumption and domestic demand, affecting via this channel the level of
prices in the economy. But, in addition to this channel of indirect pressure
on supply (through the effect of expenditure on demand), there is a direct
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CHART III.2
EFFECTIVE GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEMAND
AND AGGREGATE DEMAND (a)
see chart III.2
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
(a) Percentage change.
(b) Current prices.
(c) Net purchases plus public investment.
channel derived from the pressure that effective general government de-
mand exerts on supply (2). As shown in Chart III.2, in just seven years,
from 1976, did the growth in effective demand fall short of that of nominal
demand. The most significant year was 1992, when effective general
government demand did, in fact, decline, thus confirming the contraction
in fiscal policy that year. In 1994 effective demand also registered a neg-
ative growth rate, but the cause could largely lie in the previous year’s
overrun in expenditure. Likewise, the high growth in effective general
government demand in 1989, 1990 and 1991 and particularly in 1993 il-
lustrates the expansionary nature of fiscal policy in these years. In princi-
ple, the potential inflationary impact of the growth in effective general
government demand, which depends on the rigidities in aggregate supply
(in turn a determinant in the distribution of this demand between volume
and price), should be small, given the scant volume of this demand in re-
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( 2 ) Effective general government demand is defined as final demand, not including
compensation of employees and consumption of fixed capital, i.e. public investment plus net
purchases. The reason for eliminating these two components is that, under accounting con-
vention, they coincide exactly with the value added of general government.
CHART III.3
PUBLIC SPENDING AND INFLATION
see chart III.3
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
(a) Percentage change.
(b) Measured by the national demand deflator.
lation to aggregate demand. However, there are several reasons why this
inflationary impact may not have been negligible. For one thing, inflation-
ary pressure persisted over time: in only seven of the past 19 years was
effective general government demand lower than the growth in demand,
and this growth was negative in only two years. For another, in many
years this growth was roughly twice that of national demand; hence, de-
spite the small volume of effective general government demand in rela-
tion to total demand, its inflationary impact may have been greater than
what its scant volume would, in principle, have dictated. Lastly, it must be
borne in mind that a large part of this inflationary pressure acts precisely
in a sector of the economy (namely that of non-tradeable goods) charac-
terised by supply rigidities. As a result, it is likely to generate a very scant
or nil increase in real supply, primarily affecting prices in the sectors shel-
tered from external competition that absorb this effective demand.
Admittedly, a more detailed analysis is evidently necessary before fi-
nal conclusions can be reached on the inflationary impact of fiscal poli-
cy. However, the patterns of the growth in expenditure (Chart III.3), the
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CHART III.4
FISCAL POLICY STANCE AND INFLATION
see chart III.4
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
( a ) A plus sign denotes an expansionary stance. Data for 1989 and 1990 adjusted for the delay in per-
sonal income tax refunds..
(b) Measured by the national demand deflator.
stance of fiscal policy – fiscal impulse (Chart III.4) – and the growth in
effective general government demand (Chart III.5) are, on several
counts, similar to the inflation pattern. Specifically, the rise in inflation in
the period 1989-1991 coincides with the increase in the growth in public
spending and effective demand and also with a more expansionary fis-
cal policy.
To summarise, from this descriptive approach we can deduce that fis-
cal policy probably had a considerable inflationary impact. Thus, almost
without exception, over the past 20 years the growth in public spending
and in effective general government demand has outpaced the growth in
demand. In addition to this pressure on prices via public spending, the in-
efficient provision of certain public services generated further inflationary
effects.
III.2. Fiscal policy and the external sector
A simplistic view of the relationship between the budget deficit and
the current-account deficit, such as that taken from a strictly accounting
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CHART III.5
EFFECTIVE GENERAL GOVERNMENT DEMAND
AND INFLATION
see chart III.5
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
(a) Net purchases plus public investment, percentage change.
(b) Measured by the national demand deflator.
perspective, may prove inappropriate. In 1993, for instance, the budget
deficit rose from 4.2 % of GDP to 7.5 %, but did not prevent the current-
account deficit – the nation’s net borrowing – from falling to 0.4 % of GDP
from 3 % of GDP. Conversely, the reduction in the budget deficit in 1994
by 0.8 points of GDP was accompanied by an increase in the current-ac-
count deficit, which climbed to 0.7 % of GDP.
Indeed, the available evidence(3) seems to confirm that, in the past,
higher budget deficits have not generated higher current-account deficits.
The balance on current account appears to have oscillated around equi-
librium over the past 30 years, whereas the budget deficit fluctuated
greatly in the same period. This empirical evidence, coupled with the find-
ings for 1993 and 1994, would suggest that the potential impact of fiscal
policy on the current-account deficit is minimal.
It would be a great mistake, however, to conclude that fiscal policy
does not affect the external imbalance. The evidence for 1993 is relative-
ly insignificant, because the movements in the budget and external imbal-
ances are the product of a third element not taken into consideration: the
recession. In effect, a recession has a negative impact on the budget im-
balance – the result of the automatic stabilisers at play – and a positive
impact on the external sector – with imports affected by the fall in de-
mand, but not necessarily exports(4). Thus, the outcome for 1993 is a
short-term result directly linked to the recession and unsustainable in the
long run. Similarly, the movements in both imbalances in 1994 were influ-
enced by the recovery in the economy that year.
Chart III.6 clearly illustrates this impact of the business cycle. The
movements in the current-account deficit/budget deficit relationship from
1989 to 1992 for OECD countries as a whole do not seem to coincide
with the accounting identity (dotted line), according to which the increas-
es in the budget deficit would lead to movements of a similar volume and
sign in the current-account deficit. In fact, these movements are contrary
to the accounting forecast – perpendicular to the dotted line – because, in
general, there is a worsening in the budget deficit but an improvement in
the current-account balance. Nonetheless, as noted, these movements
should not be interpreted as evidence of the irrelevance of budgetary pol-
icy in determining the current-account balance, since they are the product
of the recession’s impact on both balances. Indeed, the only country
where this movement seems to coincide with the dotted line is Germany,
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( 3 ) For an analysis of the inter-relatedness of the private- and public-sector deficits
and the current-account deficit within the EU, see Argimón and Roldán (1994).
(4) In fact, the contraction in the domestic market can have a positive impact on ex-
ports, since part of production is re-routed to markets abroad.
which suffered not only the cyclical shock affecting the other countries but
also a structural shock caused by reunification. In short, the findings for
Spain in 1993 and 1994 (and for the rest of the OECD countries from
1989 to 1993) are influenced by short-term cyclical elements and can-
not, therefore, be considered to disprove the existence of a long-term re-
lationship between the budget deficit and the current-accountd e f i c i t .
Moreover, several important transformations in recent years must
also be borne in mind. Specifically, the full liberalisation of capital move-
ment in 1991 along with Spain’s entry into the Exchange Rate Mecha-
nism (ERM) in 1989 (i.e. the shift to a fixed exchange-rate system)
shaped a different framework from that of the past. With free capital
movements, a fixed exchange rate and the increasing substitutability of
national and foreign assets, fiscal policy became a stronger force in solv-
ing current-account balance problems. Indeed, this is what the available
empirical evidence appears to demonstrate(5): in countries where there
is free movement of capital, changes in the budget deficit are associated,
in the long run, with changes in the current-account balance.
Lastly, although difficult to quantify, the possible impact on the com-
petitiveness of the Spanish economy produced by the expansionary fiscal
policy implemented since 1989 must also be taken into account. In this
respect, expansionary fiscal policy forced monetary policy to play a
greater role in combating inflationary pressures (rekindled, in turn, by fis-
cal policy), and this ultimately had adverse effects on sectors exposed to
external competition (more dynamic and less inflationary), while the shel-
tered sectors (more inflationary) were not affected to the same degree. In
short, this imbalance in policy mix affected the competitiveness of the
Spanish economy and, via this channel, the external deficit.
To summarise, the scant correlation observed between the budget
deficit and the current-account deficit (in Spain particularly in 1993, and in
the OECD in recent years) should not lead us to underestimate the im-
pact of fiscal policy on the current-account deficit and competitiveness.
The recent recession could, in fact, have hidden the effects that the fiscal
stance (expansionary since 1989) and the widening of the budget short-
fall could have had on the current-account deficit and the competitiveness
of the Spanish economy. The economic upturn, the recovery in private
consumption, productive and residential investment and the resulting de-
cline in the private sector’s net lending may all highlight these potential
effects of fiscal policy on the structural external deficit.
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(5) See Argimón and Roldán (1994).
III.3. Fiscal policy credibility and economic agents’ uncertainty
The credibility of fiscal policy and of economic policy in general is cru-
cial to policy effectiveness. Thus, fiscal policy has greater room for ma-
noeuvre if, for example, it can use the announcement of measures as an
instrument of economic policy. If, conversely, it lacks sufficient credibility,
this “announcement effect” cannot be used, and the effectiveness of fis-
cal policy is diminished.
But insufficient credibility also signifies a loss of efficiency insofar as
the degree of uncertainty of economic agents increases. If fiscal policy is
a source of uncertainty, this greater uncertainty will hamper the economic
estimates on which economic agents’ intertemporal decisions are based.
Also, and in particular, it will have adverse effects on the stability and lev-
el of private investment, potential output and employment. Stability will be
affected because uncertainty generates the avoidable fluctuations in in-
vestment decisions that are associated with changes in information con-
cerning the influence of fiscal policy on aggregate demand. Investment
levels will be affected because of the resulting postponement of certain
investment projects (since the decision not to invest until the uncertainty
is dispelled can, in some cases, result in higher profitability than that gen-
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CHART III.6
BUDGET AND CURRENT-ACCOUNT BALANCES
see chart III.6
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 54.
erated by an immediate investment) and the rise in real interest rates
(due to higher risk premia). If, by contrast, fiscal policy is credible and is
accompanied by plans spanning several years with precise, clear and ob-
servable objectives, then it can benefit economic activity by diminishing
the uncertainty in the economic setting in which agents operate.
Problems of credibility have been attributed to fiscal policy in Spain. It
is argued that fiscal consolidation plans spanning several years (such as
the first Convergence Programme) have proved impossible to implement
only a few months after being announced and that State budgets have
not been met, not only with respect to the volume of the deficit, revenue
and expenditure, but also with respect to their composition. Lastly, the
lack of credibility is also attributed to the legislative measures that shape
the fiscal and legal framework in which firms and economic agents oper-
ate. This framework has been seen to change from one year to another,
in some cases in a contradictory fashion, cases in point being the reform
and subsequent counter-reform of personal income tax laws in 1992, and
the extension of unemployment benefits in 1989 and their subsequent re-
duction in 1992.
In 1993 these problems grew particularly acute. Compared with a
State deficit forecast of PTA 1,432 billion, the final result (in terms of com-
mitted expenditure and receipts pending collection) was PTA 3,396 bil-
lion, more than triple the previous year’s deficit (PTA 1,066.3 billion). This
behaviour is due not only to the year’s moderate advance in revenue (up
2 %, compared with a forecast of 3 %) but also, above all, to the strong
deviation in expenditure (up 18.5 %, compared with a forecast of 5.4 %).
Even the breakdown of revenue and expenditure differed from initial pro-
jections. On the revenue side, tax takings declined and extraordinary in-
come, such as revenue from profits and dividends, increased. And on the
expenditure side, there was an overrun in all items except personnel
costs and financial expenses. Briefly stated, the 1993 budget outturn not
only signified a change in the stance of fiscal policy but also meant a loss
of confidence in the initial budget as an instrument for forecasting the
year’s public spending and revenue.
It can be argued that these deviations in 1993 were the product of the
unexpected recession or of its extraordinary depth. As a result, in prepar-
ing the year’s budget, the projected growth in activity was higher than it
actually turned out to be. In sum, the cyclical sensitivity of the budget,
coupled with the uncommon depth of the recession, would explain the
scale of the budget’s deviations in 1993 (or in other years).
Yet though the factors adduced certainly clarify part of the develop-
ments that year, there are other elements pointing towards more deeply
rooted causes for these deviations. First, from the perspective of the re-
cent past, the budget outturn in 1993 was not unusual. As shown in Chart
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III.7, which reflects the nominal growth in expenditure in each budget (ini-
tial appropriations) and the resulting growth in the budget outturn (defined
in terms of committed spending), growth forecasts were systematically
lower than the actual outturn, with the – not fortuitous – exception of 1983
and 1984. This pattern of recurrent deviations can only occur if the State
budget for expenditure, far from representing a rigid constraint, is flexible,
highly adaptable and, by extension, hardly effective in capping growth in
spending. Although unexpected changes can arise in the macroeconomic
setting that can directly affect public spending, via unemployment bene-
fits, for example, it is difficult to explain such a persistent pattern of devia-
tions over an entire business cycle in terms of these surprises.
The uncertainty associated with the course of the business cycle
does not appear to explain the failure to meet the budget. Table III.1
gives the estimates for the credibility gap of the State budget. This gap is
defined simply as the difference between the actual budget outturn for
revenue and expenditure (in terms of committed expenditure and recog-
nised receipts) and that envisaged in the initial budget projection. Thus, a
minus sign in the gap denotes a credibility problem in fiscal policy. In turn,
this credibility gap is calculated for revenue and expenditure adjusted for
the cyclical effect, i.e. in terms of fiscal impulse. This provides for an eval-
uation of whether the credibility problem ultimately stems from the s u r -
prises over developments in the business cycle. In addition, a disaggre-
gated calculation of this gap is made for revenue, expenditure and their
respective captions.
As shown in Table III.1, the comparison between the deficit gap (the
change therein) and the fiscal impulse gap does not lend support to the
interpretation that the business cycle is the explanatory factor in budget
deviations. Indeed, a large part of the observed deviation persists when
adjustment is made for the effect of the cycle (which is reflected in the fis-
cal impulse) and, therefore, the uncertainty over future developments in
activity does not seem to be the source of the problem of fiscal policy
credibility. Here again, it is important to take into account that the figures
for 1989 and 1990 are distorted by the transfer of refunds relating to ex-
cess personal income tax paid in 1988 from 1989 to 1990, creating an
upward bias in the contractionary nature of the 1989 budget outturn vis-à-
vis its initial projection.
Another characteristic feature is that the budget outturn as from 1990
was, with the exception of 1992, systematically more expansionary than
initially forecast, as reflected in the minus sign in the credibility gap calcu-
lated in terms of fiscal impulse. Looking at the breakdown between ex-
penditure and revenue, another key element in this problem emerges:
whereas the final results for revenue were generally more contractionary
than intended in the initial budget (with the exception of 1990, due to the
distortion produced by personal income tax refunds), the results for ex-
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penditure were, without exception, more expansionary. These same fea-
tures, though less pronounced, persisted in the 1994 budget outturn,
since the absence of any significant deviations was largely due to the fact
that the economic backdrop was more favourable than forecast when the
budget was being prepared. The year 1993 deserves special mention,
since it witnessed a most notable deviation in the State budget that was
attributed to the unexpected intensity of the recession. However, an anal-
ysis of Table III.1 seems to rule out this explanation, suggesting instead
the hypothesis of a change in the fiscal policy stance during the year:
most of the deviation is explained by the discretionary action reflected in
the estimated fiscal impulse. Moreover, even if this indicator failed to ad-
just the deficit properly for the effect of the cycle, this unexpected cyclical
effect would be incapable of causing deviations in all expenditure compo-
nents, from expenses for goods and services to real investment.
In examining the disaggregation of expenditure in its assorted compo-
nents, it can be seen that not all captions were equally expansionary in
the budget outturn. In particular, whereas the investment outturn was
usually more contractionary than budgeted (except in 1991 and 1993),
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CHART III.7
STATE BUDGET
INITIAL APPROPRIATIONS AND COMMITTED EXPENDITURE
see chart III.7
Source: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda.
(a) Growth rate in relation to the previous year's committed expenditure.
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TABLE III.1
CREDIBILITY GAP: STATE (a)
CHANGE IN
BUDGET BALANCE . . . . . . . . . 0.57 1.80 –0.59 –0.64 0.16 –3.96 0.00
FISCAL IMPULSE (c) . . . . . . . . . . 0.35 1.51 –0.53 –0.44 0.69 –3.56 –0.13
Fiscal impulse of revenue(c) . . 1.00 1.56 –0.35 0.12 0.85 0.25 0.04
Fiscal impulse of expenditure( d ). 0.65 0.04 0.17 0.56 0.16 3.82 0.17
Personnel costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.12 –0.21 0.03 0.08 –0.08 0.21 0.07
Purchases of current goods
and services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.06 0.00 0.01 –0.01 0.00 0.17 –0.01
Financial expenses. . . . . . . . . . . 0.37 0.24 0.03 0.42 –0.09 0.05 –0.08
Current transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.32 0.42 0.18 –0.04 0.84 2.81 0.11
To Autonomous Communities. . 0.10 0.20 0.04 –0.23 0.48 0.48 –0.32
To local governments. . . . . . . . –0.04 –0.16 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.16
To autonomous administrative
agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.24 0.16 –0.01 –0.03 0.35 1.53 –0.04
To Social Security. . . . . . . . . . . –0.03 0.18 0.27 0.26 –0.09 0.32 0.28
To autonomous commercial
agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.02 –0.02 0.01 –0.02 –0.06 0.02 0.02
To public-sector firms and
other public institutions . . . . 0.10 0.18 –0.03 0.04 –0.14 0.32 0.01
To private-sector firms . . . . . . . –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 0.01 –0.01 0.00 –0.01
To households and non-profit
institutions serving  households . –0.01 –0.00 –0.03 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.01
Abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.10 –0.13 –0.11 –0.16 –0.07 –0.01 –0.08
Real investment. . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.04 –0.37 –0.22 0.52 –0.45 0.25 –0.06
Capital transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.06 –0.06 0.14 –0.42 –0.07 0.29 0.13
199419931992 (b)1991199019891988
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Banco de España and own calculation.
(a) Difference, as a percentage of GDP, between the figures for the budget outturn in terms of firm
revenue and committed expenditure, less those contemplated in the initial budget.
(b) The 1991 data were adjusted to make them homogeneous with the 1992 structure (institutional
change in the Tax Revenue Service and the Postal Service).
(c) A plus sign denotes a contractionary stance.
(d) A plus sign denotes an expansionary stance.
the outturn of current transfers and financial expenses was more expan-
sionary than in the initial budget targets. Here again this feature reflects
problems in the design of fiscal policy. In the case of investment, its con-
tractionary outturn points to inter-relatedness between the political cycle
and the budget: in dealing with a deviation from the deficit target, it is
easier (i.e. less costly in political terms) to trim investment than to reduce,
for example, entitlement spending in the area of welfare benefits. With re-
spect to current transfers, their expansionary outturn reflects the adapt-
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ability of budgetary stringency amid pressures from economic agents.
The fact that, among current transfers, those assigned to autonomous
communities and social security were largely responsible for the budget
overrun indicates that the credibility problem of fiscal policy is not con-
fined solely to the sphere of the State but affects the whole of general
government. As to the overrun in financial expenses, this striking feature
possibly reflects a technical flaw in the preparation of the budget, in that
interest payments depend on the debt issued the previous year and, con-
sidering the small portion of debt securities with maturities of less than
one year, they should be perfectly well known at the time of drawing up
the new budget.
To summarise, the findings for budget deviations suggest that there
was, at least to 1993, a credibility problem in the area of fiscal policy. The
persistence of overruns over time, the systematically expansionary nature
of the budget outturn (compatible with a contractionary outturn in revenue
and an expansionary result in expenditure) and the magnitude of the de-
viations in the case of current transfers to other general government
agents confirm that the origin of this credibility problem lies in the ineffec-
tiveness of the overall budget constraint. This indicates the existence of
flaws in the institutional framework, either in budget techniques or in the
inadequate provision for expenses in the initial budget. There is no easy
solution to such institutional problems. One possibility would be to estab-
lish rules limiting the growth in expenditure, although designing effective
ones would be most complicated.
Since 1990, rules of this type have been included in Article 10 of the
Budget Law, setting a ceiling on both the variation in initial appropriations
(extraordinary and supplementary appropriations were not allowed to ex-
ceed a certain percentage of initial appropriations) and in expenditure
commitments (these could not exceed initial appropriations, except in the
case of expenditure generated by extraordinary appropriations, supple-
mentary appropriations and prior income). However, due to the sizable
difference between actual and forecast expenditure, Article 10 had to be
rescinded in the 1993 budget. Although this illustrates the difficulty in
defining rules with sufficient guarantees, it does not mean that such rules
are, though imperfect, of no use. Their usefulness lies in the fact that they
make compliance, or non-compliance, with the initial budget constraint
more transparent, raising the cost of potential overruns and ensuring a
stricter budget outturn in the future.
From this standpoint, Article 10 cannot be said to have failed in its
mission; not even in 1993, when its applicability was overturned. In short,
one lesson that can be drawn from the behaviour of budget deviations
since 1976 is that the rules setting ceilings on growth in expenditure,
such as those in Article 11 in the 1995 budget, are at least useful in limit-
ing the scale of these deviations.
IV
PUBLIC DEBT, THE BUDGET DEFICIT AND MONETARY UNION
IV.1. The Maastricht Treaty and the excessive deficit criterion
The Maastricht Treaty obliges the European Council to conduct regu-
lar examinations of the state of public finances in member states, the aim
being to control risks associated with an unbalanced or expansionary fis-
cal stance. In concrete, these examinations have been conducted since
the start of the second stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU),
i.e. since 1994; however, examinations will not be accompanied by sanc-
tions (in the event of an excessive deficit) until the start of Monetary
Union, except regarding the potential forgoing of Cohesion Funds in the
case of recipient countries thereof. But what is most relevant about the
excessive deficit criteria is that those countries whose public finances
have not – in the terms established in these criteria – been restored to
health may not join the Monetary Union.
The criteria, which are designed to establish when there is an exces-
sive deficit, are defined in articles 104c(2) and 104c(3) of the Union
Treaty and in article 1 of the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure.
Outlined below, these articles establish that:
A) The Commission shall prepare a report on a member country if
at least one of the following criteria is met:
— The budget deficit/GDP ratio exceeds 3 %, except if:
ii) This ratio is diminishing continuously and substantially
and is close to the reference value.
Or, alternatively:
ii) The excess over the reference value is exceptional and
temporary, and the ratio remains close to its reference
value.
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— The public debt/GDP ratio exceeds 60 %, unless it declines
sufficiently and draws close to its reference value at a satis-
factory rate.
— If, despite compliance with the foregoing criteria, the Com-
mission considers there is a risk of an excessive deficit in the
member state..
B) The Commission will moreover take into account:
— If the budget deficit is greater than public investment.
— Other relevant factors, such as the budgetary and economic
position in the medium term.
As can be seen, these criteria contain a sufficient degree of ambiguity
so as to avoid the problems that might arise from the strict application of
rigid and scarcely justifiable rules from a regulatory standpoint(1).
In any event, regardless of the debatable rationality (in terms of eco-
nomic theory) of these criteria about the existence of an excessive deficit,
the fact is they must be met if Spain is to be in a position to gain access
to Monetary Union. Beyond the potentially harmful effects that the fiscal
position may have on inflation or the external deficit (analysed elsewhere
in this study), fiscal consolidation is an unavoidable obligation, imposed
externally by the Maastricht Treaty.
Currently, the budget deficit/GDP ratio in Spain stands at 6.7 % in
1994, with public investment accounting, moreover, for only 3 % of GDP.
As to the public debt/GDP ratio, this stood at 60.4 % in 1993, rising to 63
% in 1994. Further, the partial absolutions provided for in the Treaty can-
not be applied, since these deviations cannot be classified as either ex-
ceptional or temporary.
Such non-compliance means that Spanish public finances fit the defi-
nition of an excessive budget deficit, meaning a process of budgetary
consolidation is vital if Spain is to be part of Monetary Union. We are thus
obliged to implement, as part of a convergence programme, fiscal policy
measures to bring about the reduction of the budget deficit/GDP ratio and
invert the current rising trend of public debt. The success of these mea-
sures, as the failure of the Spring 1992 Convergence Programme brings
to mind, will depend on the following: awareness of the causes underpin-
ning this excessive deficit; establishing means and measures to check
the problem from the outset; and lastly, not having success hinge on un-
controllable exogenous variables, such as the pick-up in the national or
international economy.
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(1) In effect, the 60 % level would be attained in the long term if the deficit remained at
3 % of GDP, real GDP growth at 2.5 % (which would approximately be the long-term poten-
tial growth) and inflation at 2.7 %.
Before analysing the convergence programmes, it should be specified
that the problem of the excessive Spanish deficit is far from an exception
in the European context. Indeed, all European countries – excepting Ger-
many, Ireland and Luxembourg – currently fail to meet the budget deficit
criterion, albeit to differing degrees. In the Spanish case, the most worry-
ing feature is, as earlier discussed, the trend growth of expenditure and
systematic overrunning of forecasts.
IV.2. Convergence programmes
The Convergence Programme submitted by the government in spring
1992 sought, in addition to responding to the commitment undertaken
with the European Commission, to frame an overall economic policy de-
sign. This design, in its strands of fiscal policy and structural reforms,
would be such as to allow the Spanish economy to comply with the re-
quirements governing access to the third stage of EMU in 1997.
A key element here was the fiscal policy stance in the following years.
Indeed, although the stock of public debt stood at that time well below the
requirement per the excessive deficit criteria, the budget deficit stood at
4.4 % of GDP in 1991 and was subsequently revised upwards to 4.9 %.
That meant a fiscal consolidation drive had to be made. In effect, the pro-
gramme aimed at a very ambitious and demanding budgetary consolida-
tion target. Thus, for 1996, the overall general government deficit was set
at 1 % of GDP. Naturally, it is now clear how unattainable this target was;
such an ambitious fiscal consolidation plan was excessively wilful.
The failure to comply with the Convergence Programme, at least in its
fiscal facet, was evident but a few months after its presentation. The ulti-
mate reason for this was the excessive optimism of the programme’s
macroeconomic scenario: the forecast for GDP growth for 1992 and 1993
was 3 % and 3.3 %, respectively.
Actually, beneath the surface impression of severity in the budget
deficit area, the fiscal consolidation project entailed but a scant effort to
reduce the imbalance in public finances, as the reduction would be due
exclusively to the high economic growth forecast. Set against the 3.4 per-
centage points decline in the budget deficit contained in the Programme
(from 4.4 % of GDP to 1 % of GDP), the implicit reduction in the structural
deficit was estimated at only 0.7 percentage points of GDP(2), the re-
mainder corresponding to the effect of the cycle.
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(2) The figures are taken from González-Páramo and Roldán (1992).
Exacerbating this excessive confidence in the recovery in activity as a
deficit-attenuating factor was an insufficient assessment of the underlying
structural tensions of the deficit. The budget deficit in 1991 (the year the
Convergence Programme was set in motion) had thus been underesti-
mated by half a point of GDP. Adding to this factor, which on its own
might be viewed as almost anecdotal, were other problems, such as the
build-up in the public health-care area of unrecognised spending for a to-
tal of PTA 461 billion.
In short, the first Convergence Programme failed with regard to the
budgetary consolidation target. The cause was excessive confidence in
the possibility of containing the tendency of the structural deficit to over-
run and in the contribution of the business cycle to the decline in the bud-
get deficit. Of these two elements, the latter undoubtedly played a greater
role, since the forecast for real GDP growth was 3 % for 1992, 3.3% for
1993 and 3.6 % for 1994 and 1995. However, had there been a commit-
ment behind the budget deficit target to reduce the structural deficit, with
this acting as an anchor for these budgetary consolidation objectives, the
scale of the deviations by the Programme would have been less. Thus,
the combination of excessive optimism about developments in activity
and the lack of a target for reducing the structural deficit account for the
premature failure of the Convergence Programme of Spring 1992.
The second Convergence Programme, approved in July 1994, incor-
porates the government’s new commitment regarding fiscal consolidation
and structural reform. Although neither the quantitative nor qualitative in-
formation is detailed enough to draw firm conclusions about the possibili-
ty of the planned policy succeeding, a preliminary reflection may be
made.
The Programme’s commitment in budget-deficit terms targets a drop
from 7.3 % in 1993 (7.5 % after the latest revision) to 3 % in 1997, a re-
duction of 4.3 percentage points of GDP. In any event, the budget deficit
in 1996 would exceed the ceiling set by the excessive deficit criterion by
1.4 percentage points, though it would be on a downtrend such as to
meet one of the conditions of access to Monetary Union. Gross public
debt, for its part, would increase by almost ten percentage points of GDP
between 1993 and 1997, rising from 57.8 % of GDP(3) to 67.2 % of
GDP, declining only in 1997 and by 0.3 percentage points of GDP. The
60 % limit would thus be exceeded, although 1997 would mark the start
of a declining path that might also suffice to meet another of the condi-
tions pacted under the European Union Treaty for Monetary Union mem-
bership.
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(3) The gross public debt/GDP ratio for 1993 is currently estimated at 60.4 %.
Regarding the distribution by government level (see Table IV.1) of
this commitment to reduce the budget deficit, the biggest drive in abso-
lute terms is to be made by central government. Thus, while the territorial
governments would lower their deficit by 0.9 percentage points of GDP –
from 1.2 % in 1993 (1.3 % after the latest revision) to 0.3 % in 1997 – ,
central government would cut their deficit by 3.4 percentage points of
GDP. Although the quantitative impact of the measures envisaged in the
Programme is not detailed, the reduction target would be supported by
three pillars: the cut in public spending by three percentage points; the
maintenance of the individual tax burden (foreseeing, in effect, a fall in
the revenue/GDP ratio); and a series of structural reforms to smooth at-
tainment of the deficit-cutting goal, improving the efficiency and competi-
tiveness of the Spanish economy. While these structural measures are
not sufficiently specified either, the most important ones would be the re-
form of the Budget Law; the improvement of management procedures;
the reform of benefits for sick leave from work (unifying temporary labour
disability and provisional invalidity, and reducing their excessive duration,
of up to six years), as already expressed in the budget for 1995; combat-
ing tax fraud, etc.
The spending component where the biggest containment effort is to
be made is government consumption. Specifically, it is sought in the gen-
eral government area to reduce the weight of this item in terms of GDP
from the level of 17.2 % in 1993 (17.5 % following the latest revision) to
15.7 % in 1997, a decline of 1.5 percentage points of GDP. In this con-
nection, measures such as the following would be established: wage set-
tlements in terms of forecast inflation; the containment of public-sector
employment (only 50 % of vacancies arising would be covered, with ex-
ceptions made for certain under-staffed bodies, this directive having been
substantially amended further to agreements with the trade unions); and
the charging of levies for the provision of certain public services. Some
ambiguity remains in the area of public investment, where no quantifica-
tion has been offered, it being stated that an infrastructure investment
drive greater than that of the EU average will be sustained. Lastly, re-
garding transfers, the reform of disability benefits has been announced,
as has the reinforcement of the contributory nature of pensions and the
maintenance of their purchasing power.
Turning to revenue, the maintenance of the individual tax burden is
ensured, and a fall in the revenue/GDP ratio is tentatively forecast. This
fall would be the outcome of (i) the smaller profits of the Banco de Es-
paña (which were extraordinarily high in 1992 and 1993, making for a
considerable increase in State revenue from profits and dividends in 1993
and 1994); (ii) the delayed impact of the recession on revenue; and (iii)
the discretionary investment-promoting measures in the area of corporate
income tax. Likewise, the emphasis on the privatisation of State-owned
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companies is apparently to be lessened, it being argued that the size of
the Spanish public corporate sector is less than that in most EU
countries(4).
Table IV.2(5) details, for central government, the foreseeable course
of expenditure, revenue and the deficit (in budgetary accounting terms,
which explains the discrepancy in the deficit figures between Tables IV.1
and IV.2). As can be seen, the cut in the budget deficit is attained thanks
to the reduction in the expenditure/GDP ratio of almost four percentage
points. In fact, the revenue/GDP ratio diminishes by half a point. As to the
intensity of the spending-containment drive, this is focused on 1995, in
which the spending/GDP ratio falls by 1.5 percentage points (with nomi-
nal growth running at a most moderate rate of 2.6 %). However, the loss
of revenue that the Programme foresees for 1995 prevents this restrictive
drive from taking the form of a bigger reduction in the deficit during the
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TABLE IV.1
THE JULY 1994 CONVERGENCE PROGRAMME (a)
PERCENTAGE OF GDP:
General government deficit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 6.7 5.9 4.4 3.0
Central government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6.1 5.7 5.1 3.8 2.7
State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 8 5.0 4.6 3.5 2.5
Social Security and central government
administrative agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.2
Territorial governments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.3
Debt
Gross. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57.8 62.7 65.9 67.5 67.2
Net. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 8 60.7 63.9 65.5 65.2
GDP GROWTHS (%):
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Nominal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.6 5.8 6.5 7.5 8.6
Real . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–1.0 1.3 2.8 3.9 3.9
Deflator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 6 4.4 3.6 4.0 4.0
Source: Programa de Convergencia, Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda.
( a ) The figures for 1996 and 1997 for real growth and the deflator are averages. All figures in
Spanish National Accounts terms.
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
(4) That said, the 1995 Budget includes revenue from privatisation proceeds amount-
ing to about PTA 300 billion, some privatisations having already been carried out while oth-
ers are under way.
(5) The absence of figures for 1993, along with the lack of a consolidated outturn for
central government as a whole, accounts for the gaps in the information furnished.
year. In any event, these two characteristics – the adjustment via spend-
ing and the front-loaded nature of the containment drive – clearly differen-
tiate the present Convergence Programme from its predecessor, in which
the budgetary consolidation goal was pursued via an appreciable in-
crease in revenue, and in the latter years of its duration.
In sum, despite the gaps in the Programme (namely, the absence of
detailed information and the lack of specificity of the structural reforms af-
fecting the course of revenue and spending), it does establish a clear,
discernible commitment to reduce the budget deficit thanks to a cut in
public spending in the early years of the period in question. Rigorous
compliance with this commitment in 1995 and 1996 is essential in view of
the Programme’s optimism about foreseeable nominal GDP growth in the
later years and owing to how tight attainment of the budgetary consolida-
tion goal will be.
IV.3. Public debt
Changes in public debt expressed as a proportion of GDP are proving
of great importance for the analysis of public sector activity. This is so for
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TABLE IV.2
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT: REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE (a)
PERCENTAGE OF GDP:
Expenditure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40.3 38.8 37.8 36.9
Revenue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34.8 33.8 34.1 34.3
Deficit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 5.0 3.7 2.6
ABSOLUTE CHANGES (IN PERCENTAGE POINTS OF GDP):
Expenditure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.5 –1.0 –0.9
Revenue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.0 0.3 0.2
Deficit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.5 –1.3 –1.1
GROWTH RATES (%):
Expenditure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 4.8 5.9
Revenue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 8.5 9.1
Deficit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –3.2 –20.3 –23.5
GDP GROWTH (%):
MEMORANDUM ITEM:
Nominal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.6 5.8 6.5 7.5 8.6
Source: Programa de Convergencia, Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda.
(a) In budgetary terms.
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
several reasons. First, because it is one of the factors to be taken into ac-
count, under the Maastricht Treaty, on determining whether there is an
excessive budget deficit problem (although the Treaty is ambiguously
worded when specifying this criterion). Further, it allows general govern-
ment conduct to be analysed taking the approach of the financial view of
revenue and expenditure transactions, which acts as a consistency test
for what is obtained from the angle of non-financial operations. This is
most relevant bearing in mind that changes in gross public debt are not
prone to the problems of creative accounting (mainly via fictitious finan-
cial assets) which frequently distort the meaning of the budget balance.
Moreover, it can act as a leading indicator of fiscal policy, especially in
the case of territorial tax administration, whose agents provide but greatly
lagged and incomplete information of their non-financial transactions.
But besides these more or less indirect reasons, the debt/GDP ratio is
of interest in itself due to its macroeconomic impact. Questions such as
the effect of fiscal policy on real long-term interest rates or the long-term
sustainability of fiscal policy hinge directly on developments in the
debt/GDP ratio.
This section briefly reviews the debt/GDP ratio and its determinants,
comparing it, in turn, with developments in other European countries and
projecting its future path in terms of alternative circumstances that aim to
reflect the sensitivity of the ratio to changes in its determinants. Ques-
tions such as the impact of the debt/GDP ratio on interest rates, or the
sustainability of debt and the measurement thereof, are thus set aside,
requiring as they would a more detailed analysis(6).
IV.3.1. The dynamics of debt
Public debt moves over time in keeping with the following relationship:
[I]
where Dt is public debt at the beginning of year t (or at the end of year t-
1), St is the primary surplus and i is the nominal interest rate (in t-1). As
percentages of GDP, this relationship would be:
[II]dt + 1 = dt 
(1 + it)
(1 + nt)
 – st
Dt + 1 = Dt (1 + it) – St
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( 6 ) A more detailed analysis of these issues can be found in González-Páramo,
Roldán and Sebastián (1991) and Ballabriga, Dolado and Viñals (1991).
where n is the nominal growth of the economy in year t. Note that only if
the nominal interest rate were greater than nominal growth could there be
a problem of sustainability (otherwise public debt, as a proportion of
GDP, would tend towards zero in the long term). Nonetheless, even if the
nominal interest rate were not to exceed nominal growth, increases in the
debt/GDP ratio would foreseeably affect the interest rate ultimately, rais-
ing it and eventually generating problems of sustainability.
Before analysing changes in this debt ratio in Spain and in other EU
countries, it should be specified that the above expression is applied for
net debt (financial liabilities less financial assets), while it is gross debt
that is the concern of this study. In principle, for questions of sustainabili-
ty, of potential impact on the course of interest rates, the net position –
public debt minus financial assets – should be analysed. However, the
possibility of the aforementioned creative accounting techniques being
used to mask part of the budget deficit means that the net position is, to
say the least, equivocal. It is, therefore, more advisable to consider gross
debt. Further, and not for reasons other than those indicated, the Maas-
tricht Treaty refers always to gross public debt when setting the exces-
sive budget deficit criteria.
But despite the soundness of these reasons (which prove determina-
tive), taking only the gross position into account and leaving asset analy-
sis aside may distort the analysis. Thus, for example, in the case of Den-
mark, the existence of deposits in the central bank for the management of
foreign reserves coupled with the assets held by the Danish Pension So-
cial Fund biases the debt ratio upwards by approximately twenty percent-
age points of GDP.
IV.3.2. Comparison of movements in public debt: 1982-1994
Charts IV.1 to IV.7 depict public debt and its determinants for Spain
and six other EU countries – Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom,
the Netherlands and Belgium – in the period 1982-1994. Taking the top
chart first, this shows us developments in gross debt from 1982 onwards,
the ceiling on debt set at Maastricht (60 % of GDP) and the public debt
that would result from the accumulation of past budget deficits (taking the
stock of debt in 1980 as a base). Regarding this latter concept, the aim is
simply to illustrate the course of financial assets (which, in principle,
should coincide with the difference between gross debt and that resulting
from the accumulation of the deficits, according to expression [II]). Insofar
as these financial assets are mostly fictitious, the differing trends of gross
debt and net debt (understood as that resulting from the accumulation of
budget deficits) offer information about the role of fictitious assets on
smoothing the trend of the deficit over time.
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The central chart depicts the effect on movements in the debt/GDP
ratio of the primary balance and the differential between GDP growth and
the effective interest rate on gross debt. This effective interest rate is de-
fined as the ratio of the interest burden in a specific year to public debt in
circulation at the beginning of the same year (or at the end of the previ-
ous year). The bottom chart confines itself to separating this differential
into two components: the growth rate and the effective interest rate. This
effective interest rate does not generally coincide with the rate at issue of
public debt (since the rate on the debt will depend on the rates ruling as
of the time of issue of each of the securities making up the debt). And nor
will it generally be the average rate on debt issued under regular market
conditions (insofar as there are public debt securities, such as special
government debt, the cost of which is lower than that prevailing in the
market at the time of issue). Lastly, it should be remembered that, for
there to be problems of sustainability of public debt, a necessary condi-
tion is that this differential (the GDP growth rate less the effective interest
rate on public debt) should be negative. If it is negative, the government,
aiming at meeting solvency conditions, will be obliged at some point to
generate primary surpluses.
Chart IV.1 shows Spanish public debt and its determinants. As the
top chart evidences, gross public debt has grown intensely in Spain, mov-
ing from 26.5 % of GDP in 1982 to an estimated 63 % for 1994, exceed-
ing the 60 % ceiling since 1993. If the course of accumulated deficits is
observed, we also see there is a high growth in financial assets, particu-
larly during periods of high deficits (between 1984 and 1986). That points
to the use of fictitious financial assets to lessen the impact of the crisis (or
of fiscal policy loosening) on the budget deficit figures, shifting part of this
effect to the future.
Moving to the underlying factors of these dynamics, the first promi-
nent fact is that the differential between real GDP growth and the real in-
terest rate is positive for most of the period considered. Indeed, until 1991
there was no public debt sustainability problem. However, after 1991 this
differential turned very negative (approaching eight percentage points in
1993 and still over three percentage points in 1994), which accounts for
the surge in the growth of debt between 1991 and 1994. As regards the
course of the primary balance, three different periods can be distin-
guished: (i) from 1982 to 1987, marked by a primary deficit of a sizable
magnitude, but diminishing to reach primary equilibrium in 1987; (ii) from
1987 to 1992, marked by fluctuations of the primary balance around zero;
and (iii) the years 1993 and 1994, in the first of which there was a consid-
erable deterioration of the primary balance (though far off the high levels
reached in the early eighties), corrected to a very minor extent during
1994. In 1993, the combination of the rise in the primary deficit with the
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CHART IV.1
SPAIN
see chart IV.1
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda and Banco de España.
(a) Real GDP growth rate less real effective interest rate on gross debt.
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CHART IV.2
GERMANY (a)
see chart IV.2
Sources: European Commission and IMF.
(a) To 1990, western Germany.
(b) Spliced series.
(c) Real GDP growth rate less real interest rate on gross debt.
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CHART IV.3
FRANCE
see chart IV.3
Source: European Commission.
(a) Real GDP growth rate less real effective interest rate on gross debt.
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CHART IV.4
ITALY
see chart IV.4
Source: European Commission.
(a) Real GDP growth rate less real effective interest rate on gross debt.
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CHART IV.5
UNITED KINGDOM
see chart IV.5
Source: European Commission.
(a) Spliced series.
(b) Real GDP growth rate less real effective interest rate on gross debt.
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CHART IV.6
NETHERLANDS
see chart IV.6
Source: European Commission.
(a) Real GDP growth rate less real effective interest rate on gross debt.
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CHART IV.7
BELGIUM
see chart IV.7
Source: European Commission.
(a) Spliced series.
(b) Real GDP growth rate less real effective interest rate on gross debt.
increase in the differential between GDP growth and the effective cost of
public debt account – along with the increase in financial assets(7) – for
the growth of the debt/GDP ratio by twelve percentage points.
Lastly, the decomposition of the differential into real GDP growth and
into the real effective interest rate on the debt is shown in the bottom
chart. The highlight of real GDP growth is its strength, although from
1987 onwards a slow deceleration of this growth is discernible, culminat-
ing in the 1993 recession and the start of a new period of growth in 1994.
As to the real effective interest rate, it can be seen to be on a rising trend
throughout the period, this being particularly intense in the sub-periods
1982-87 and 1990-94. The trend reflects the increase in financing at mar-
ket prices, associated with the disappearance of the monetisation of the
deficit (at the outset of the eighties), financing via compulsory investment
reserves, and the use of public debt securities that were opaque for tax
purposes. In any event, this process of adaptation to debt financing under
market conditions is almost complete (now Treasury recourse to the Ban-
co de España has been eliminated, only special government debt re-
mains). Accordingly, this effective cost of debt will not grow notably in the
coming years.
Turning to the international comparison, Charts IV.2 to IV.7 address
public debt and its determinants in Germany, France, Italy, United King-
dom, the Netherlands and Belgium, respectively. Despite differing trends
in these countries, some economic policy conclusions can be drawn.
First, changes in the differential between the real GDP growth and the
effective interest rate in these countries are far different than in Spain. In
none of these countries has this differential been persistently positive,
meaning that Spain has enjoyed what might be termed a privileged situa-
tion which has, in any event, now run its course. This relatively favourable
situation was attributable more to the lower effective cost of debt than it
was to the Spanish economy’s high growth rate. Among the countries
considered, two sub-groups can be distinguished. In one group, compris-
ing Germany, United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium, the effec-
tive cost of debt, though fluctuating, is not on a rising trend (thereby indi-
cating the absence of privileged financing). The second group, made up
of France, Italy and Spain, shows growth of the effective interest on debt
throughout the period considered. That points to the existence of means
of privileged financing, which have progressively been disappearing dur-
ing the eighties. In any event, of these three countries it is Spain which
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(7) In 1993, and as a result of the disappearance of Treasury recourse to (i.e. borrow-
ing from) the Banco de España, there was an over-issue of long-term public debt aimed at
creating a liquidity buffer in the Treasury’s account at the Banco de España. This accounts
for part of the heavy increase in the debt/GDP ratio that year.
departed in the early eighties from a lower effective cost, whereby it en-
joyed a better initial situation than the other two countries.
Regarding the primary balance, the main conclusion drawn from the
international comparison is that in those countries where the debt/GDP
ratio has reached very high levels, there is a primary surplus. This is the
case of Italy, the Netherlands and, in particular, Belgium. The build-up of
public debt conclusively leads to a decline in fiscal policy leeway, thus
forcing through a considerable slide in public spending, excluding inter-
est. In short, high budget deficits make a contraction of the primary deficit
necessary sooner or later; accordingly, from the standpoint of the supply
of public goods, such supply cannot be financed indefinitely with public
debt.
Lastly, it should be highlighted how the experience of countries with
higher debt/GDP ratios (that of Italy in particular) is illustrative of the dan-
gers that arise by allowing high deficits over prolonged periods. Italy, in-
deed, set out in 1982 with a situation giving little rise to concern: it had a
debt/GDP ratio of 65 % and a very low effective interest rate on its debt
(lower than – 3 % in real terms). Despite this, the persistence of a primary
deficit of over 3 % until about 1988 led debt to settle at over 90 % of
GDP. In just six years, Italy’s excessively expansionary fiscal policy
brought debt onto an explosive path.
In sum, several conclusions can be drawn from the comparison of the
patterns of public debt and its determinants. First, that Spain enjoyed a
relatively advantageous situation, since access to means of privileged fi-
nancing meant that the effective cost of its debt could be very low com-
pared with that of other countries. Second, that this advantage has now
disappeared as the public sector no longer has access to privileged fi-
nancing. Third, that the persistence of high deficits leads unavoidably to
cuts in the supply of public goods (to increases in the primary surplus);
accordingly, the question is not whether to pursue a contractionary fiscal
policy, but when to do so, with low debt ratios (which increases the mar-
gin for manoeuvre of fiscal policy) or high ones (which completely elimi-
nates such margin for manoeuvre). Lastly, the experience of countries
with high debt/GDP ratios (specifically Italy) indicates that only a few
short years of fiscal uncontrol are needed to place debt on an explosive
path.
IV.3.3. Public debt to the year 2000
Table IV.3 and Chart IV.8 trace the course of the budget deficit and
public debt in alternative frameworks of developments in prices (encom-
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TABLE IV.3
DEFICIT AND DEBT DEVELOPMENTS
(1994-1999)
%
BASE SCENARIO:
1994 –1.4 9.3 4.1 2.0 63.0 6.7
1995 –0.7 8.8 3.6 2.8 65.1 5.9
1996 0.8 8.5 3.3 3.5 65.2 4.4
1997 2.0 8.2 3.0 3.5 64.2 3.0
1998 3.0 8.2 3.0 3.5 62.1 1.9
1999 3.8 8.2 3.0 3.5 59.2 1.0
NO ADJUSTMENT (a):
1994 –1.4 9.3 4.1 2.0 63.0 6.7
1995 –1.4 8.8 3.6 2.8 65.7 6.6
1996 –1.4 8.5 3.3 3.5 68.1 6.6
1997 –1.4 8.2 3.0 3.5 70.4 6.6
1998 –1.4 8.2 3.0 3.5 72.8 6.8
1999 –1.4 8.2 3.0 3.5 75.3 7.0
LOWER-THAN-EXPECTED GROWTH (b):
1994 –1.4 9.3 4.1 2.0 63.0 6.7
1995 –0.7 8.8 3.6 2.5 65.2 5.9
1996 0.8 8.5 3.3 2.5 66.0 4.4
1997 2.0 8.2 3.0 2.5 65.7 3.1
1998 3.0 8.2 3.0 2.5 64.3 2.1
1999 3.8 8.2 3.0 2.5 62.1 1.2
PRICE STABILISATION (c):
1994 –1.4 9.3 4.1 2.0 63.0 6.7
1995 –0.7 9.3 4.1 2.8 65.0 6.2
1996 0.8 9.3 4.1 3.5 65.2 4.8
1997 2.0 9.3 4.1 3.5 64.1 3.6
1998 3.0 9.3 4.1 3.5 62.0 2.5
1999 3.8 9.3 4.1 3.5 59.1 1.5
PESSIMISTIC SCENARIO (d):
1994 –1.4 9.3 4.1 2.0 63.0 6.7
1995 –1.4 9.3 4.1 2.5 65.9 6.9
1996 –1.4 9.3 4.1 2.5 68.9 7.1
1997 –1.4 9.3 4.1 2.5 71.9 7.4
1998 –1.4 9.3 4.1 2.5 75.0 7.6
1999 –1.4 9.3 4.1 2.5 78.2 7.9
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Banco de España and own calculation.
(a) If the primary deficit does not vary.
(b) If GDP growth does not exceed 2.5 % from 1995 onwards.
(c) If the GDP deflator does not drop below 4.4 %.
(d) Combination of the three foregoing scenarios.
Assumptions
Primary
surplus
(% of GDP)
Nominal
interest
GDP
deflator
Real
GDP
Debt/GDP
ratio
Budget
deficit
(%of GDP)
Results
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CHART IV.8
DEFICIT AND DEBT DEVELOPMENTS
(1991-1999)
see chart IV.8
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Banco de España and own calculation.
passed in the GDP deflator), real growth, and fiscal policy stance (en-
compassed in the forecast for the primary surplus). It is assumed that the
nominal interest rate (calculated for the first year as the 1994 interest bur-
den divided by the stock of public debt in circulation at the end of 1993)
trends in line with prices, so that falls in inflation (in the GDP deflator)
lead to falls of the same magnitude in the interest rate. Accordingly, the
hypothesis of constant real interest rates is maintained.
The basic framework seeks to outline a macroeconomic and fiscal sit-
uation that would enable Spain to be in a position to join the Economic
and Monetary Union in 1999. Unlike the Convergence Programme, a
more intense slowdown in prices is assumed (a bigger fall in the GDP de-
flator), although so too is appreciably lower real GDP growth (it would not
exceed 3.5 %). The results are, in any case, quantitatively similar: the
deficit stands at 3 % in 1997 – and at 1 % in 1999 – and debt begins to
fall as from 1996 to below 60 % by the end of the century. The main dif-
ference with the Convergence Programme is that public debt, in this sim-
ulation, would be three percentage points lower than the related Conver-
gence Programme forecast. The source of this difference may lie either in
the nominal interest rate considered (which is greater in the Convergence
Programme) or in the existence of assumed debt of public-sector corpo-
rations, reflected in public debt and not in the deficit.
The alternative scenarios considered -non-existence of a contrac-
tionary fiscal policy, lower-than-expected growth, stabilisation of prices
and another, of a pessimistic hue, combining all the aforementioned
ones- seek to track the sensitivity of the course of the deficit and of debt
to changes in their determinants. As regards the lower-growth scenario, it
should be underscored that it does not take into account the impact of the
cycle on the budget deficit; as a result, holding on the path of primary-sur-
plus reduction would require a greater fiscal containment drive.
With regard to the results in Chart IV.8, the main conclusions are as
follows:
— The absence of a fiscal consolidation drive and the downward
stickiness of inflation would prevent the budget deficit target being
met in 1997.
— As to public debt, the inertia of its growth makes it impossible to
prevent its growth in the initial years, meaning it will be above the
60 % threshold in 1997. Unlike the case with the budget deficit,
public debt is not very influenced by greater inflation. It is, howev-
er, affected by lower-than-forecast real growth in the basic sce-
nario. In the absence of any correction of the primary deficit, this
would entail placing public debt on a path of permanent growth
which, logically, would prove unsustainable in the medium term.
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— The so-called pessimistic scenario (which is not in fact far re-
moved from the basic scenario, except in the lack of fiscal-policy
containment) illustrates the dangers of an absence of fiscal con-
solidation that ultimately affects real growth and inflation expecta-
tions. In such a case, in the run-up to the year 2000, public debt
and the budget deficit would be on a path that would lead Spain,
in a few short years, to a situation similar to that of countries such
as Belgium or Italy.
In short, the simulations performed confirm that although the fiscal
consolidation drive needed to contain the growth of debt is great, greater
still are the dangers of abandoning control of the budget shortfall. To
summarise, it seems vital that, in the coming years, the moderately con-
tractionary stance adopted by fiscal policy in 1994 should be intensified:
first, to permit access to the Monetary Union; and further, to prevent
Spanish public finances reaching a point of deterioration requiring a most
costly correction.
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VSUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
From 1988 to 1993, the budget deficit widened considerably to 7.5 %
of GDP in the latter year. True, the economic recession can account for
part of the increase in the deficit. But most of this deterioration is due to a
discretionary rise in public spending (underpinned by the extension of
welfare-state entitlement spending), which rises in revenue were unable
to offset. Moreover, while the increase in public spending has been of a
permanent nature, the rise in revenue has largely been temporary. That
will require a greater degree of rigour in the control of public spending in
the coming years so as to avoid an additional widening of the deficit.
This drive to cut spending in 1994 was moderate, although it meant a
turnaround on the pattern of previous years. Deprived of a portion of the
aforementioned revenue of a temporary nature, it only provided for a re-
duction of the budget deficit to 6.7 % of GDP. This came about, more-
over, in a year of economic recovery, with higher-than-forecast growth.
The aim set out in the Convergence Programme to lower the deficit to
5.9% of GDP in 1995 implies a lesser containment drive than that made
in 1994 in view of the expected improvement in economic circumstances.
Accordingly, this figure needs to be strictly observed, thereby enabling
the move onto the fiscal consolidation path foreseen for the coming
years.
The fiscal policy stance over the period under study was expansion-
ary and, in the cyclical upswing, tended to exacerbate the economy’s dis-
equilibria. Disaggregated analysis of revenue and expenditure confirms
the expansionary effect of the latter since 1988, an effect not offset by the
revenue side.
Fiscal policy must have had a quite appreciable inflationary impact.
Thus, the growth of public spending and final general government de-
mand has, in the past twenty years, been systematically higher than that
of national demand. Adding to this medium-term influence from 1988 on-
wards was the change in fiscal policy settings, which may have contribut-
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ed to exacerbate the inflationary pressures triggered by the cyclical up-
turn in the economy.
As regards the scant correlation observed between the budget deficit
and the current-account deficit (particularly in 1993), this should not lead
to an underestimation of the potential impact of fiscal policy on the cur-
rent-account deficit. Indeed, the recession may have masked the effect
that the widening of the budget imbalance may have had on the balance-
of-payments deficit on current account. The economic recovery and the
pick-up in private consumption and in productive and residential invest-
ment, together with the diminished financing capacity of the private sector
that this entails, may bring to light these potential effects of fiscal policy
on the current-account deficit.
The evidence gathered on budgetary deviations confirms there is a
problem in the fiscal policy area, which arises due to the scant effective-
ness of budgetary restraint. Shortcomings in institutional arrangements,
both in budgetary control techniques and in the way the Budget is ap-
proved, may account for such inefficiency.
Like many other EU countries, Spain currently fails to meet the exces-
sive-deficit criterion required to join Monetary Union. This led in 1994 to a
new Convergence Plan being submitted, to provide for compliance with
this condition. The first Convergence Programme did not attain the bud-
getary consolidation foreseen, owing to excessive wilfulness regarding
both the possibility of curbing the tendency of the structural deficit to
overrun and the quantification of the cyclical component of the budget
deficit. As to the new Convergence Programme, it establishes -despite
several gaps- a clear, accurate commitment to reduce the budget deficit
thanks to a cut in public spending in the initial years of the period it
spans. In spite of this commitment, the Programme’s optimism (regarding
attainable growth), the tight budgetary consolidation target set and the
absence of an explanation detailing the means that will enable these ob-
jectives to be achieved mean that exceptional rigour will be vital in its im-
plementation.
With respect to public debt, the following conclusions were reached
further to the comparative analysis of its dynamics. First, that Spain bene-
fited in the past from an advantageous situation since access to privi-
leged means of financing meant that the effective cost of debt was rela-
tively low compared with that of other European countries. Second, that
this advantage has now disappeared because the public sector no longer
has access to privileged means of financing. Third, that the persistence of
heavy deficits has forced those countries with high debt/GDP ratios into
cuts in their supply of public goods (into increases in their primary sur-
plus); accordingly, the question is not whether to pursue a contractionary
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fiscal policy, but when to do so, with low debt ratios (which increases the
margin for manoeuvre of fiscal policy) or high ones (which completely
eliminates such margin for manoeuvre). Lastly, the experience of coun-
tries with high debt/GDP ratios indicates that only a few short years of
high deficits are needed to place debt on an explosive path. Indeed, the
simulations performed confirm that the dangers and costs of relinquishing
control of the budget deficit are enormous.
It is, in conclusion, of paramount importance that the change in fiscal
policy stance embarked upon in 1994 be consolidated in the coming
years. The tightening of the stance should be intensified so as to be in a
position to join Monetary Union and avoid a deterioration of Spanish pub-
lic finances that would prove most difficult to correct.
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APPENDIX 1
FISCAL POLICY MEASURES IN THE PERIOD 1988-1995
The analysis of fiscal policy stance in Chapter II of this paper made
an overall classification of stance as expansionary or contractionary de-
pending on the results obtained with a simple indicator of fiscal policy dis-
cretionary action -the fiscal impulse. However, the complexity of fiscal
policy is on such a scale as not to fit perfectly into indicators as compos-
ite as those used. In effect, a detailed analysis of fiscal policy reveals it to
be actually made up of an often contradictory set of legislative and ad-
ministrative measures that affect the various revenue and expenditure
captions. As shown in the adjoining tables (which detail expansionary and
contractionary discretionary measures on the revenue and expenditure
sides), it is difficult given this complex set of provisions to classify fiscal
policy in a given year as “expansionary” or “contractionary”: indeed, each
year sees a complex mix of measures of which a conspectus cannot be
readily made.
Notwithstanding, the adjoining tables do enable certain general fea-
tures to be observed. Notable in 1988, for instance, was the absence of
expansionary measures on the expenditure side, while in 1989 there was
evidently a discretionary increase in public spending, partly financed by
tax increases. Moreover, 1992 was clearly a year of fiscal policy contain-
ment. 1993 was one of confusion and change with all sorts of measures,
some contractionary, most expansionary, on both the revenue and ex-
penditure sides, while 1994 was noteworthy for contractionary conduct on
the expenditure side. Added also is a table summarising the main mea-
sures in the 1995 Budget, along with those other measures taken previ-
ously but which could have a bearing in 1995; logically, however, it is not
known what the final impact of all these measures will be.
In any event, when interpreting the effect of the measures detailed in
the year tables, several issues should be taken into account. First, and
evidently, not all measures have the same impact: it is not possible to
compare the various measures without having some vague, approximate
idea about what these represent in monetary terms. An analysis of the
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TABLE A.1.1
1988
Increase in revenue
CONTRACTIONARY MEASURES
Reduction in expenditure
Reduction in revenue
EXPANSIONARY MEASURES
Increase in expenditure
Social security contributions
— Increase of one point in contribution rate for Special
Regime for Household Service Employees.
Excise duties
— Increase in rates (alcohol, beer and tobacco).
Compensation of employees
— Wage rise of 4 %.
Net purchases
— Cut in military investment and in current expenditure
by the Ministry of Defence.
Interest
— Assumption of investment certificates by the ICO
(Official Credit Institute).
— Fall, in 1987, in average rates at issue on Treasury
notes.
Pensions
— Revaluation of the order of half a point below inflation.
Personal income tax
— Increase in revenue in 1987, not matched in 1988,
further to Royal Decree 2535/1986, which intro-
duced monthly periodicity in earned-income with-
holdings for small and medium-sized comanies and
increased capital withholdings and partial tax pay-
ments for business activiries.
— 5 % reduction in the tax schedule scale.
— Reduction in withholdings on earned income for
remuneration less than PTA 2 million (RD 9 dated
January 15 1988).
Taxes related to imports
— Lowering of tariff barriers vis-à-vis the EC.
Social security contributions
— Reduction of three-tenths of a point in the contribu-
tion rate to FOGASA (Wage Guarantee Fund).
— Lesser increase in the minimum and maximum con-
tribution bases (lower than forecast inflation).
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TABLE A.1.2
1989
Increase in revenue
CONTRACTIONARY MEASURES
Reduction in expenditure
Reduction in revenue
EXPANSIONARY MEASURES
Increase in expenditure
Personal Income Tax
— Transfer to 1990 of refunds relating to excess tax
paid totalling PTA 325 billion (as a result of Constitu-
tional Court ruling 45/89).
— Increase in capital income withholdings, and subjec-
tion of financial accounts in Treasury bills, asset
repos and single-premium insurance policies (Royal
Legislative Decree 5 dated July 7 1989).
— Effect on net tax payable/refundable of the reduction
in withholdings on earned income applied in 1988
pursuant to RD 9/88.
Corporate income tax
— Increase in the number of prepayments and in the
overall amount thereof (30% fi 55 %).
— Increase in capital income withholdings, and subjec-
tion of financial accounts in Treasury bills, asset
repos and single-premium insurance policies (RLD
5/89).
Taxes related to imports
— Increase in the Common External Tariff.
Excise duties
— Increase in rates on alcohol, beer and tobacco.
Social security contributions
— Increase in rates for Agricultural and Household
Service Special Regimes.
— Unification of categories for maximum-base purpos-
es.
Compensation of employees
— Wage rise of 4 %.
Investment and transfers (current and capital)
— PTA 193 billion reduction of credits (RDL 3/89).
Investment and capital transfers
— Additional adjustment to RLD 3/89 totalling PTA
114.6 billion.
Capital transfers
— Reduction of PTA 60 billion in connection with
reconversion and reindustrialisation plans, and of
PTA 65 billion for iron and steel industry measures
agreed with the EC.
Taxes related to imports
— Lowering of tariff barriers vis-à-vis the EC.
Excise duties
— Reduction in hydrocarbons rates.
Social security contributions
— Reduction in contribution rate to FOGASA (Wage
Guarantee Fund).
Compensation of employees
— Additional payments in April and May totalling PTA
23.9 billion to increase civil servants' purchasing
power (RLD 3/89).
— Additional revaluation of retiree pensions (RLD
3/89).
— 7 % growth in staffing.
Unemployment
— Extension of eligibility to the long-term unemployed,
with special consideration for those aged over 45
with dependents, for a cost of PTA 81.1 billion (RLD
3/89) .
Contributory pensions
— Additional revaluation, costing PTA 28.7 billion (RLD
3/89).
— Equating of minimum pension with legal minimum
wage, costing PTA 47.1 billion in 1989 (RLD 3/89).
— Additional payment for the Agricultural, Household
Service and Self-Employed Regimes.
Welfare assistance pensions and LISMI (benefits re-
lating to the Law on the social integration of the mental-
ly and physically handicapped).
— Improvement in benefits for a cost of PTA 10.7 billion
(RLD 3/89).
Capital transfers
— Early repayment of INI (State Industrial Holding
Company) and FORPPA (Agricultural Price and
Product Regulation Fund) debts assumed by the
State (PTA 187.7 billion more than in 1988).
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TABLE A.1.3
1990
Increase in revenue
CONTRACTIONARY MEASURES
Reduction in expenditure
Reduction in revenue
EXPANSIONARY MEASURES
Increase in expenditure
Personal income tax
— Increase in capital income withholdings and subjec-
tion of specific financial assets (RLD 5/89), effective in
the period January-August.
Corporate income tax
— Increase in prepayment amounts (55% ® 60 %).
— Increase in capital income withholdings and subjec-
tion of specific financial assets (RLD 5/89), effective in
the period January-August.
Taxes related to imports
— Increase in the Common External Tariff.
VAT
— Delay in VAT refunds for fiscal year 1990.
Excise duties
— Increase in rates (hydrocarbons and tobacco).
Social security contributions
— Increase in rates for the Agricultural Special
Regime.
Compensation of employees
— Wage increase of 6 %.
Interest
— Decline in average rates at issue on Treasury notes.
State expenditure
— Introduction of a ceiling on the growth of committed
spending (article 10 of Budget Law).
Personal income tax
— Greater net effect of transfers from one year to the
next of refunds for excess net tax paid.
— Deflation of the fiscal 1989 schedule and of earned
income withholdings.
Corporate income tax
— Effect of increase in prepayments in 1989 on net tax
payable/refundable.
Taxes related to imports
— Lowering of tariff barriers vis-à-vis the EC.
VAT
— Increase in VAT paid to the EC totalling PTA 38 bil-
lion, corresponding to the settlement of fiscal years
1988 and 1989.
Social security contributions
— Decline in contribution rate to FOGASA (Wage
Guarantee Fund).
Compensation of employees
— Payroll payment of PTA 52,525 to civil servants
(RLD 1/90).
— Agreement to introduce automatic-inflation-adjust-
ment clause into wages (with effect in 1991 and
1992 as well).
Pensions
— Revaluation above inflation.
— Agreement to revalue on the basis of the November-
on-November CPI of previous year (with effect in
1991, 1992 and 1993).
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TABLE A.1.4
1991
Increase in revenue
CONTRACTIONARY MEASURES
Reduction in expenditure
Reduction in revenue
EXPANSIONARY MEASURES
Increase in expenditure
Personal income tax
— Lesser net effect of transfers from one year to the
next of refunds for excess net tax paid.
Taxes related to imports
— Rise in the Common External Tariff.
VAT
— Reduction of VAT return to EC (25 %® 5% ) .
Excise duties
— Rise in hydrocarbons rates.
Social security contributions
— Rise in rates for Agricultural Special Regime.
Personal income tax
— Net effect of deflation of schedules and withholding
tables on earned income (with different lags) in fis-
cal years 1990 and 1991.
— Exemption from withholdings of capital income re-
ceived by non-residents.
— Introduction of optional tax allocation to the Catholic
Church.
— Effect on the net tax collected in 1991 of the in-
crease in withholdings on capital returns, which af-
fected takings related to this item in the period Jan-
uary-August 1990.
Corporate income tax
— Effect of the increase in prepayments in 1990 on net
tax.
Taxes related to imports
— Lowering of tariff barriers vis-à-vis the EC.
VAT
— Delay in VAT refunds for 1990.
— VAT adjustment 90/91, Navarre region (Law 28/90).
Social security contributions
— Lowering of rates for the Self-Employed Special
Regime.
Compensation of employees
— Wage rise of 6.26 %.
— Application of the automatic-inflation-adjustment
clause to wages.
Contributory pensions
— Application of revaluation agreement.
— Revaluation of minimum pensions.
Non-contributory pensions
— Effects of their introduction by Law 26/90.
Interest
— Tendency towards financing under closer-to-market
conditions.
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TABLE A.1.5
1992
Increase in revenue
CONTRACTIONARY MEASURES
Reduction in expenditure
Reduction in revenue
EXPANSIONARY MEASURES
Increase in expenditure
Personal income tax
— Lesser net effect of transfers from one year to the
next of refunds for excess net tax paid.
— Change in objective-estimation procedure and in calcu-
lation of partial payments (RD 1841 dated December
30th 1991).
— Effect to net tax raised in 1991 of the rise to 25 % in
withholdings on capital income, which began to be
applied in August 1989 and which therefore affected
takings for this item during the period January-
August 1990.
— Introduction of the optional tax allocation to the
Catholic Church, which affected 1991 revenue for
the first time.
VAT
— Rises of one and two points in January and August,
respectively, in the standard rate.
— Delay in fiscal 1992 refunds.
Excise duties
— Changes in rates in January 1992 (hydrocarbons
and tobacco).
Social security contributions
— One-point rise in contribution rate relating to unem-
ployment; increases in Agricultural Special Regime
of 0.75 points for self-employed workers and 0.5
points for dependent employees.
Compensation of employees
— Freeze in public-sector offers of employment (RDL D
5/92, urgent budgetary measures).
Unemployment
— Effects of RLD 1 dated April 3rd 1992, which re-
duced the amount and duration of the contribution-
based benefit and raised the number of months' contri-
butions required for entitlement to this benefit.
Temporary labour disability
— Transfer to employers of related expenses incurred
from day three to fifteen after disability arises (RLD 5
dated July 21st 1992).
Health care benefits
— Control of fraud in Social Security medication al-
lowance for pensioners and other groups (RDLD
5/92, urgent budgetary measures).
Personal income tax
— Change in withholdings table applicable to earned
income obtained in 1992, contained in RD 1841 dat-
ed December 30th 1991, which approves the new
personal income tax regulations. This lowering of
withholdings was partly adjusted by RLD 5 dated
July 21 st 1992 (under urgent budgetary measures).
— New treatment of capital income which, in Law 18
dated June 6th 1991, entailed a deviation by saving
towards assets exempt from withholding tax.
— Deflation of the 1991 personal income tax schedule,
affecting the net tax collected in 1992.
Taxes related to imports
— Lowering of tariff barriers vis-à-vis the EC.
VAT
— Reduction of top rate (33 % ® 28 %).
Compensation of employees
— Wage rise of 5 % and application of the automatic-
inflation-adjustment clause to wages.
Net purchases
— Restatement of Social Security liabilities prior to
1992.
Contributory pensions
— Revaluation of minimum pensions.
— Extra payment for Household-Service and Self-Em-
ployed regimes.
Non-contributory pensions
— Effects of their introduction pursuant to Law 26/90.
Interest
— Tendency towards Treasury financing under closer-
to-market conditions.
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TABLE A.1.6
1993
Increase in revenue
CONTRACTIONARY MEASURES
Reduction in expenditure
Reduction in revenue
EXPANSIONARY MEASURES
Increase in expenditure
Personal income tax
— Modification (with back-dated effect) of the personal
income tax schedule for fiscal year 1992, and delay
in the correction of the withholdings table applicable
to earned income that year.
— No deflation of the withholdings table in 1993.
— Deviation by saving towards assets exempt from
withholding tax as a result of the entry into force in
1992 of Law 18 dated June 6th 1991, reforming per-
sonal income tax.
— Introduction of new sectors into the module-based
objective-estimation modality.
Taxes related to imports
— Introduction of general sales tax in the Canary
Islands.
Excise duties
— Creation of special duties on certain means of trans-
port.
— Modification of rates in January 1993 (alcohol, beer
and tobacco).
— Modification of rates in August 1993 (hydrocarbons).
Social security contributions
— Rise of 0.5 points in the General Regime rate, of 0.5
points and 0.75 points, respectively, in the Agricul-
tural Special Regimes for dependent workers and
the self-employed, and of 0.16 points in the Self-
Employed Regime.
— Raising of the maximum contribution bases of
groups 5 to 11.
— Reduction of rebates for employment promotion
(RLD 1 dated April 3rd 1992).
Compensation of employees
— Wage rise of 1.8 %.
— Staff reductions in State sector.
— Restatement of Social Security liabilities prior to
1992 for a lesser amount than in that year.
Unemployment
— Effects of RLD dated April 3rd 1992, which cut the
amount and duration of the contributory benefit and
increased the number of months' contributions re-
quired for entitlement to this benefit.
Temporary labour isability
— Transfer to employers of related expenses incurred
from day four to fifteen after disability arises (RLD 5
dated July 21st 1992).
Health care benefits
— RD 83/93 on selective financing of medication.
Personal income tax
— Greater net effect of transfers from one year to the
next of refunds for excess net tax paid.
— Change in 1992 in the objective-estimation proce-
dure and in the calculation of partial payments (RD
1841 dated December 30th 1991).
— Reduction of partial payments in module-based ob-
jective-estimation procedure (RLD 3 dated February
26th 1993).
Corporate income tax
— Increase in tax allowance for R+D spending and for
exportation.
Taxes related to imports
— Lowering of tariff barriers vis-à-vis the EC.
VAT
— Lowering of rates in January 1993 (28 % ® 15 %,
6 % ® 3 %), in contrast to the rises effected in
1992.
— New treatment of intra-Community transactions.
— Delay in refunds for fiscal year 1992.
Excise duties
— Change in filing period (alcohol and beer).
Unemployment
— Promotion of part-time, fixed-term hiring (RLD 3 dat-
ed February 26th 1993).
Contributory pensions
— Application of the revaluation agreement.
Non-contributory pensions
— Effects of their introduction by Law 26/90.
Interest
— Tendency towards Treasury financing under closer-
to-market conditions.
Subsidies
— Subsidy to RTVE (State Broadcasting Corporation).
Net purchases, investment and transfers
(current and capital) by the State
— Annulment of article 10 of the Budget Law, which
set a ceiling on the growth of committed spending.
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TABLE A.1.7
1994
Increase in revenue
CONTRACTIONARY MEASURES
Reduction in expenditure
Reduction in revenue
EXPANSIONARY MEASURES
Increase in expenditure
Personal income tax
— No deflation of the withholdings table.
— Subjection to taxation of the contributory unemploy-
ment benefit and partial and complete permanent
labour disability pensions.
— Lesser net effect of transfers from one year to the
next of refunds for excess net tax paid.
— Change in 1992 in objective-estimation procedure, hav-
ing a bearing on 1993 revenue.
— Lesser reduction of partial payments in module-
based objective-estimation procedure, in relation to
that introduced pursuant to RLD 3/93 of February
26th, offset by the appearance of a reducing coeffi-
cient per staff employed.
Corporate income tax
— Elimination of the PTA 500,000 allowance for job
creation.
VAT
— New treatment of intra-Community transactions, en-
tailing a transfer of revenue from 1993 to 1994.
— Delay in refunds from fiscal year 1992.
Excise duties
— Modification of rates in August 1993 (hydrocarbons).
— Modification of rates in January 1994 (alcohol, beer
and tobacco).
— Change in filing period in 1993 (alcohol and beer).
Social security contributions
— Rise of 0.5 points in the contribution rate payable by
employees relating to unemployment.
Compensation of employees
— Wage freeze.
— Staff reduction in State sector.
Unemployment
— Transfer to the unemployed of their portion of the re-
lated contribution to Social Security Funds.
— Restricting of access to unemployment subsidy via
lowering of income ceiling below which entitlement
arises.
— Reduction of the amount of the subsidy and of the
maximum and minimum limits of the contributory
benefit.
Temporary labour disability
— Transfer to employers of related expenses incurred
from day four to fifteen after disability arises (RLD 5
dated July 21st 1992).
Contributory pensions
— Revaluation based on forecast inflation (lower than
actual inflation) 
Health care benefits
— Reduction of the selling price of medication.
— Discounts agreed on with Official Pharmacists' As-
sociations.
Personal income tax
— Modification with back-dated effect of the personal
income tax schedule for fiscal year 1992, and delay
in the adjustment of the withholdings table applica-
ble to income from work that year.
— Effect of “coupon-washing” operations as a result of
the tax exemption accorded to yields on government
debt held by non-residents, introduced pursuant to
RLD 5 dated December 20th 1990 (under urgent fis-
cal measures.
— Change in procedure for calculating partial pay-
ments under the direct-and coefficient-based objec-
tive-estimation modalities, further to a Supreme
Court ruling of November 12th 1993.
Corporate income tax
— Increase in fiscally admissible depreciation for new
fixed assets (RLD 3 dated February 26 1993).
— Elimination of limit on carryforward of negative tax
bases for new companies).
— New depreciation tables (Ministerial Order dated
May 12th 1993).
VAT
— Extension to specific sectors of the special rapid-re-
fund procedure (RLD 1811 dated September 2nd
1994).
Excise duties
— Incidence of RENOVE plans (government-spon-
sored incentive scheme to stimulate new car sales)
on tax on certain means of transport, virtually offset
by increased sales induced by these plans.
Non-contributory pensions
— Effects of their introduction pursuant to Law 26/90.
Interest
— Tendency towards Treasury financing under closer-
to-market conditions (prohibition of recourse to the
Banco de España).
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TABLE A.1.8
1995
Increase in revenue
CONTRACTIONARY MEASURES
Reduction in expenditure
Reduction in revenue
EXPANSIONARY MEASURES
Increase in expenditure
Personal income tax
— Lesser reduction of partial payments in module-
based objective-estimation procedure, in relation to
that introduced in 1994, and inclusion of new sectors
in this modality.
— Effect of the change in procedure for calculating par-
tial payments under the direct- and coefficient-based
objective-estimation modalities.
VAT
— One-point increase in applicable rates.
Excise duties
— Increase in rates (hydrocarbons, alcohol, beer and
tobacco).
Compensation of employees
— Wage rise of 3.5 %.
Contributory pensions
— Revaluation based on forecast inflation.
Temporary labour disability and provisional invalid-
ity
— Fusion into a single concept and reduction of the
maximum duration of the benefit.
Personal income tax
— Deflation of withholdings table.
— Subjection to taxation, from 1994 onwards, of the
contributory unemployment benefit and partial and
complete permanent labour disability pensions.
Corporate income tax
— Increase in fiscally admissible depreciation for new
fixed assets (RLD 3 dated February 26th 1993).
— Elimination of limit on carryforward of negative tax
bases for new companies (RLD 3 dated February
26th 1993).
— Rebate for newly created small and medium-sized
firms (Law 22 dated December 29th 1993).
— Accelerated depreciation relating to job creation
(RLD 7 dated June 20th 1994).
— Creation of a 5 % tax allowance for industrial train-
ing expenses, increase in the allowance for invest-
ment abroad and raising of the maximum limit gov-
erning investment tax deductions applicable to net
tax payable (1994 Budget Law).
VAT
— Extension to specific sectors of the special rapid-re-
fund procedure (RLD 1811 dated September 2nd
1994).
— Deduction, in the period in which they are accrued,
of VAT borne on intra-Community transactions (Law
42 dated December 30th 1994).
Excise duties
— One-point reduction in the rate of the tax applicable
to certain means of transport.
— Incidence of RENOVE-II plans (second government-
sponsored incentive scheme to stimulate new car
sales) on tax on certain means of transport.
Social security contributions
— One-point reduction in the General Regime rate (0.8
points corresponding to employer's portion, and 0.2
points to that of the employee).
— Cut of 0.8 points in the Special Regime rate for the
Self-Employed, and of one point in the special
regimes for maritime and coal workers.
Contributory pensions
— Compensation for greater inflation in 1994.
Non-contributory pensions
— Effects of their establishment pursuant to Law
26/90.
Health care assistance
— Reform of funding arrangements, departing from a
calculation base that corresponds to actual expendi-
ture (outturn + debts), although the INSALUD (the
Spanish public health service) budget appropriation
ceases to be enlargeable.
budgetary impact of each action is beyond the scope of this paper (it is, in
fact, a virtually impossible task). Consequently, in Table A.1.9., we con-
fine ourselves to offering a more detailed analysis [and with an alternative
technique to that used in Chapter II(1)] of the discretionary component of
different revenue and expenditure captions. Secondly and lastly, these
discretionary measures may have a very lagging budgetary effect that
spreads over several years. That makes it difficult both to ascribe them to
a specific year and to make a quantitative calculation. Such was the case
of the extending of unemployment benefits in 1989, which started to show
its high cost as the slowdown in activity progressively raised unemploy-
ment and labour turnover.
As stated, Table A.1.9 attempts to show the overall impact that the
various discretionary measures taken between 1988 and 1993 may have
had on revenue and expenditure captions. Outlined below are the conclu-
sions obtained from the analysis of this table:
— The results obtained in Chapter II on fiscal policy stance are con-
firmed: it is expansionary throughout the period except in 1989,
1992 and 1994 (though in 1989 the result is once more distorted
due to the transfer of personal income tax refunds to 1990).
— The contractionary nature of revenue in 1989, 1990 (once adjust-
ed for the transfer of personal income tax refunds from 1989 to
1990), 1991 and 1992 (the most contractionary year taxwise) is
confirmed. Regarding taxes:
• Personal income tax is contractionary every year except in
1990, 1993 and 1994. Its contractionary nature in 1992 is, in
principle, surprising in the light of the personal income tax re-
form entering into force that year, although the cost of the re-
form may have had a more intense bearing on 1993.
• Corporate income tax appears to have been expansionary since
1991. This result is more indicative of the problems prevailing in
capturing the high cyclical component of this tax than it is of dis-
cretionary measures. The expansionary character in 1988 is at-
tributable to a mere accounting effect (a change in the calcula-
tion of withholdings on capital between personal and corporate
income tax).
• Taxes related to imports, which are systematically expansion-
ary, reflect the effect of the lowering of tariff barriers following
EU membership.
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(1) Both are described in Appendix 2.
• VAT is contractionary in 1989 and, above all, in 1992 (when the
standard rate was raised three points). In 1993, the expansion-
ary nature is due to atypical elements (such as legislative har-
monisation or the impact on VAT takings of the disappearance
of intra-Community customs borders) which, in turn, explain the
contractionary impulse in 1994. In general, this tax evidences a
slide over the medium term in its revenue-raising performance,
perhaps reflecting tax fraud problems.
• Excise duties are contractionary in all years except 1988 and
1989 (the rates of the tax on hydrocarbons were cut in this latter
year), reflecting the tax increases associated with harmonisation
with the EU.
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TABLE A.1.9
GENERAL GOVERNMENT
DISCRETIONARY AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE DEFICIT (a)
% of GDP
Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.367 1.654 –0.352 0.167 1.846 –0.198 –0.145
Personal income tax (b). . . . . 0.128 0.746 –0.349 0.563 0.711 –0.111 –0.238
Corporate income tax (b). . . . –0.110 0.833 0.095 –0.428 –0.289 –0.239 –0.310
Taxes linked to imports. . . . . .–0.064 –0.165 –0.165 –0.135 –0.146 –0.170 –0.033
VAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.041 0.293 –0.475 –0.051 0.467 –0.583 0.300
Excise duties and other. . . . . .–0.047 –0.216 0.184 0.112 0.127 0.363 0.188
Social security contributions. –0.351 0.187 0.193 0.200 0.941 0.510 –0.028
Other revenue. . . . . . . . . . . . .0.118 –0.025 0.165 –0.096 0.036 0.032 –0.022
Expenditure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.240 1.618 1.297 1.435 0.621 2.312 –0.953
Compensation of employees. . 0.138 0.283 0.473 0.392 0.619 –0.185 –0.226
Net purchases. . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.383 0.215 –0.026 0.156 0.074 0.326 –0.143
Welfare benefits. . . . . . . . . . . .0.144 0.159 0.522 0.826 0.783 0.522 –0.146
Unemployment . . . . . . . . . . .–0.049 0.026 0.141 0.359 0.237 0.230 –0.335
Pensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.094 0.108 0.192 0.138 0.218 0.379 0.321
Temporary labour disability . 0.027 0.058 0.064 0.075 0.015 –0.100 –0.067
Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.071 –0.034 0.125 0.254 0.313 0.014 –0.064
Interest. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.103 0.133 0.272 0.205 0.240 0.977 0.080
Subsidies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.268 –0.080 –0.050 –0.111 –0.117 0.272 –0.047
Investment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .0.415 0.622 0.612 –0.109 –0.784 –0.032 –0.308
Other expenditure. . . . . . . . . .–0.238 0.287 –0.507 0.077 –0.195 0.432 –0.163
Deficit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .–0.607 0.036 –1.648 –1.268 1.226 –2.511 0.809
Sources: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Banco de España and own calculation.
(a) Defined as net lending (+) or net borrowing (–).
(b) In 1988 there was a change in the allocation of revenue relating to capital income withholdings,
leading to a transfer of such revenue from corporate to personal income tax.
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
• Social security contributions are also contractionary in all years
except 1988 (when the increases in the minimum and maximum
bases were limited) and 1994.
— Regarding expenditure, their persistent expansionary stance to
1993 is confirmed.
• Employee compensation is on a clearly expansionary line to
1993, whereafter it turns slightly contractionary.
• Net purchases, evidencing high volatility, exhibit a slightly ex-
pansionary behaviour overall.
• Social security benefits are on an increasingly expansionary line
until 1993. Caption by caption, unemployment displays slightly
contractionary behaviour in 1988 and expansionary behaviour in
the remaining years, not re-adopting a contractionary stance un-
til 1994 (despite the cut in benefits in 1992). That reflects the
problems that may arise in the computation of the discretionary
elements of expenditure (in this case due to the lag with which
the measures act and to the difficulties of adjusting for the cycle
when the correlation between employment and income increas-
es at the height of a crisis). As to pensions, their biggest expan-
sionary impulse is between 1992 and 1994, reflecting, more
than discretionary measures, the scant -or non-existent- cyclical
sensitivity of pensions spending, which boosts its weight in
terms of GDP in recessionary periods.
• The expansionary behaviour of interest reflects the increase in
financing at market prices, with the subsequent increase in the
average cost of outstanding public debt.
• Subsidies evidence a contraction as from 1989, ending with the
sharp expansion of 1993 and resuming in 1994. This pattern re-
flects the heyday of the economic climate and the freeze on
public corporation transfers in these years.
• Lastly, investment changes from expansionary in the 1988-1990
period to contractionary as from 1991, this contraction proving
especially sharp in 1992.
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APPENDIX 2
METHODS OF COMPUTING FISCAL POLICY
DISCRETIONARY ACTION
This paper has employed a fiscal policy indicator which adjusts for the
effect of the cycle on the fiscal variables of revenue and expenditure, thus
allowing the fiscal policy stance to be measured. This indicator reveals
the reaction of the economic authorities to changes in the economic envi-
ronment and acts as a leading indicator of fiscal policy.
Generally, and from a theoretical standpoint, a fiscal policy stance in-
dicator would be of the type:
[A.I]
where h is the multiplier of the reduced form of a model of the form:
[A.II]
where Y, X, Y– 1, FP and OP are, respectively, the endogenous (e.g.
GDP), exogenous (e.g. GDP of the rest of the world) and lagged endoge-
nous variables, the fiscal policy variable and other economic policy vari-
ables (e.g. monetary policy), and where FP2 and FP1 are the two fiscal
policies we wish to compare.
However, a desirable characteristic of any indicator is that it should
not depend on given theoretical models. This is something common to
the indicators usually used (in particular those developed by the IMF and
the OECD), that do not have an underlying model. This has the advan-
tage of uncoupling the indicator from controversial assumptions; but its
results need not as a consequence differ significantly from those that
would be obtained using theoretical models(1).
Y = a + b X + c Y–1 + h FP + d OP
IFP = h (FP2 – FP1)
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(1) See, for instance, MacKenzie (1988). Are all summary indicators of the stance of
fiscal policy misleading?; WP/IMF, 88/112, International Monetary Fund.
A.2.1. The IMF fiscal impulse
The IMF defines the concept of the cyclical effect of the budget (CEB)
as (2):
[A.III]
CNB being the cyclically neutral budget balance and ABB the actual
budget balance of public-sector transactions (i.e. the public deficit or sur-
plus). Likewise, the cyclically neutral balance is defined as:
[A.IV]
TR being general government revenue, S general government spend-
ing and GDPp real potential GDP multiplied by the GDP deflator at market
prices. The subscript 0 indicates the base year, and the subscript t the
year analysed.
To interpret the CNB indicator, definition [A.IV] should be re-written as:
[A.V]
The first addend is the potential neutral balance, i.e. that balance
which maintains in year t the same pressure on potential output as that
exerted by the budgetary policy of the base year. The second addend
captures the cyclical effect of GDP growth on tax revenue. If the economy
does not grow at its potential rate, revenue will be less than potential. The
CNB definition considers as neutral a fall in revenue equal to the product
of the difference between real and potential growth rates and the total
revenue of the base year. When GDP0 = GDP
p
0, the fall in neutral rev-
enue is that presented by unit elasticity with respect to the difference be-
tween potential GDP and that actually recorded.
Thus, CNB is the budget balance that would have been obtained had
the relationship between public spending and potential GDP held at the
same level as in the base year, and if public revenue had accounted for
the same proportion in terms of real GDP as in the base year. A positive
CEB will denote an expansion of fiscal policy in relation to the base year,
and vice-versa.
CNBt = 
GDPt
p
GDP0
p
 (TR0 – S0) + TR0 
GDPt
GDP0
 – 
GDPt
p
GDP0
p
CNBt = (TR0/GDP0) ×  GDPt – (S0/GDP0
p
) ×  GDPt
p
CEB t = CNBt – ABBt
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( 2 ) See Heller, P.S.; R.D.Haas and A.H.Mansur (1986). A Review of the Fiscal Im -
pulse Measure. Occasional Paper, 44, Washington, International Monetary Fund.
To limit the dependence of this indicator (of its level in particular) on
the year taken as a base, the fiscal impulse indicator is defined, as a per-
centage of GDP, as:
[A.VI]
Thus, if FI > 0, fiscal policy has been comparatively less expansion-
ary than that of the previous year, i.e. the fiscal impulse will have been
contractionary.
Before concluding, a characteristic aspect of this indicator that might
go unnoticed should be stressed. We refer to the fact that the entire effect
exerted by progressivity on revenue is attributed to the discretionary ac-
tion of fiscal policy. Since in a cyclical upturn revenue grows more quickly
than GDP, due to the fact the tax system is progressive, when the rev-
enue/GDP ratio (as opposed to the revenue/potential GDP ratio) is taken
as a reference, the increase in revenue associated with such progressivi-
ty is considered as a discretionary element; really, however, it is an effect
that arises automatically once the discretionary decision to apply prog r e s-
sive taxes has been adopted. In any event, this enables the fiscal conduct of
countries with different sets of built-in stabilisers to be compared.
A.2.2. Other alternative procedures
Alternatively, the budget balance and each of the revenue and expen-
diture captions making it up can be broken down into a permanent or
trend component and into a transitory component, which may be either of
cyclical origin or discretionary. Three components are thus obtained for
each budgetary caption: trend, cyclical and a residual incorporating all
those non-cyclical components that have a transitory effect on the deficit.
The trend component has been extracted applying to each caption of
the public accounts, expressed as a percentage of GDP, a Hodrick-
Prescott filter taking —as for the calculation of potential GDP—a lambda
equal to 5.
The basis chosen for calculating the cyclical component was a defini-
tion of the cyclically neutral balance (CNB*) modifying that of the IMF,
and introducing a cyclical impact on revenue:
[A.VII]CNBt
*
 = 
TRo
GDPo
 ×  
GDPt
GDPt
p
 – 
So
GDPo
p
 ×  
GDPt
p
GDPt
FIt = – D  
CEB
GDP t
 = – CEB
GDP t
 + CEB
GDP t–1
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where the symbols are as previously indicated. To alleviate the depen-
dence of this measurement on the year taken as a base, the average of a
sufficiently long period (1964-1994 in our case) is used as a base. Then,
to eliminate this dependence as regards the level, a regression of the
changes in the cyclical component of real GDP has been made on the
changes in the cyclical balance, thus defined. Finally, the coefficient of
this regression has been applied to the cyclical component (in levels) of
real GDP to obtain the cyclical component of the budget balance.
If the changes in the trend component and in the cyclical component
thus calculated are taken away from the changes in the actual budget
balance, we obtain the residual changes in the budget balance, which
capture the cyclical incidence of discretionary measures and of other
types of non-cyclical factors (accounting lags, administrative decisions on
spending or on revenue terms). Table A.1.9 gives the sum of these resid-
ual changes and of the trend changes for the main revenue and expendi-
ture captions.
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